The Hacendado in Argentine economic and political life 1877-1943 by Crawford, Robert Eugene
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1950
The Hacendado in Argentine
economic and political life
1877-1943
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/4421
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Thesis 
THE HACENDADO IN ARGENTINE ECONOr!IC AND 
POLITICAL LIFE 1877-1943 
by 
ROBERT mJGF.NE CRAWFORD 
(A.B., Ohio University, 194~) 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the de ree of 
Master of' Arts 
1950 
h 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I' 
1<1 50 
Cfl.A.._ 
Approved 
by 
First Reader •••• ~ ••• .1.~--~14.£ .... 
Proressor or Latin American Regional Studies 
Second Reader •• f.~./?..:· . c;~ .... 
Proressor or Social Science 
Contents 
Introduction . .................................. . 
I. Who the hacendado is: historical :foundation, 
geographical :foundation, correlation o:r 
land with prestige, correlation o:r land 
Page 
1 
with wealth, pattern o:r land acquisition.. 4 
II. Why the study dates :from lR77: the role o:r 
the hacendado in Argentina be:fore lR77.... 21 
III. The geographic lati:fundio and the latifUndio 
social; the ethnocentrism and class aspect 
of' the hacendado.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • . • • 31 
IV. The New Era: 1877-1900. The cause and 
meaning o:r change, the managerial 
revolution o:r the lati:fundio, the 
protectionism o:r the hacendado............ 44 
v. The Golden Age: 1890-1916. The :flowering 
o:r the hacendado. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • n4 
VI. The Liberal Challenge: 1916-1930. The 
challenge o:r the oligarchy by the growing 
middle class. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 62 
VII. Back to Normalcy: 1930-1943. Political 
reaction, social reaction, economic 
reaction, paradox, basic economic and 
Page 
social change... . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . - . . . . 68 
VIII. Surrender to Industrialism: 1943. The 
forced abdication or the oligarchy ••••• 
IX. The impact of the hacendado on Argentine 
life: socially, economically, 
politically, and as a nationalist •••••• 
x. Summary and Conclusions •••••••••••••• .• •• 
Bibliography •. ........ . . ...........•..... . ...... 
Abstract .. .......•.............................. 
P2 
So 
94 
97 
100 
Illustrations and Tables 
Page 
The Political Divisions o~ the Argentine 
Nation .................•..••....... ·.......• 3 
The Concentration o~ Argentina's Resources ••• 20 
Settlements De~ore 1600 •••••••••••••••••.•••• 30 
The Pattern o~ Argentine Railways •••••••••••• 43 
A Relie~ Map o~ Argentina..................... 81 
1 
Introduction 
The purpose o:f this thesis, THE IIAC NDADO IN 
ARGENTINE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIFE 1R77-1943, is the 
assembling and organizing into a single paper the avail-
able and pertinent in:formation which enables the portrait 
o:f the hacendado to be drawn and the story o:f his role in l 
Argentine li:fe to be told. This work, even with its 
obvious limitations, has not been an easy task. As Dr. 
Carl c. Taylor, well-known authority on rural Argentina, 
advised in a letter at the early stages o:f this worr, "It 
will not be an easy topic to develop in terms o:f precise 
data because the power o:f the estanciero group has been 
wielded so easily that its evidences are not too obvious. 
Yet it has been possible through the kindness o:f those 
who have assisted the assembling o:f considerable quantity 
o:f materials :from which to work. 
The Harvard University Library has yielded the 
greatest volume o:f pertinent data. The Boston University 
Library, the Boston Public Library , aiJd the Library o:f th 
commonwealth o:f Massachusetts have each made vailable 
papers otherwisely not readily obtainable. Special 
appreciation must be expressed to Janeiro v. Brooks, 
Librarian o:f the Pan American Union, and to st. George L. 
Sioussat, Chie:f o:f the Division o:f ~anuscripts o:f the 
Library o:f Congress, as well as to Lewis Hanke, irector 
2 
of the Library of Congress , for their aid in the search for 
rare and unpublished material within the scope of this 
study available in their respective libraries. 
The study was begun in 1947 under the direction of Dr. 
George n. Howard, an Argentine then on the faculty of I 
Boston University and now on the staff of the United Nation ! , 
and was brought to fruition under. the guidance of Dr. 
raurice Halperin, .1:-'rofessor of Latin American negional 
Studies at Boston University and chairman of the Department 
nr. Edward R. Collier, Professor of Social Science at 
Boston University, as reader and critic has given valued 
encouragement and suggestions. Many others have given 
freely of their suggestions and encouragement, and not smal 
was the contribution of my wife, Geraldine Hickox Crawford, 
in making the task seem easier when it was most arduous. 
The work of Mrs. Albert Fletcher in the preparation of the 
final typescript is greatly appreciated. 
I 
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The Political Divisions o~ the Argentine Nation 
4 
I. Who the hacendado is: historical roundation, 
geographical roundation, correlation or land with 
prestige, correlation or land with wealth, 
pattern or land acquisition. 
With the advent of the Sp~nish to the area or the R{o 
de la Plata in the early 16th century, the classes and 
economies, traditions and customs or medieval Europe were 
transplanted to the broad and fertile pampas which until 
then had been home only to scattered bands of nomadic 
Indians. In the ensuing rour centuries which have seen th 
rise of a modern metropolis in the city of Buenos Aires, 
the transplanted elements or reudalism with minor modiri-
cation s have maintained themselves in the pampas against 
the ravages or time with the same tenacity with which they 
have maintained themselves in the motherland. Even today 
land in large feudal-type holdings remains a vital economi 
and social ractor. This dominant influence or the land 
seems an anachronism in the day or modern industrial socie 
From the beginning of the Spanish rule, Their Catholic 
Majesties granted to those subjects who extended the Spani h 
I 
dominions vast tracts or land in reward ror their va.liant 
se~vices. Even in the days when the value or land in the 
Viceroyalty or La Plata was not established, it was 
acceptable compensation to men bred in a tradition which 
held land to be the basic economic unit, the source or 
wealth and more particularly o~ status. The broad, 
limitless Argentine plain and the sparce colonial 
population together with the social climate o~ opinion o~ 
the lAth and 17th centuries combined to establish ~irmly 
two distinct Argentine types. 
In terms of the colonial ~rontier these two types 
were the caudillo and the gaucho. The caudillos, a 
landed aristocracy, were the overlords o~ the pampas, too 
powerfUl to be more than nominally under the control o~ 
the viceroy whose power did not extend in ~act ~ar beyon 
the limits o~ the capital city. The gaucho, who su~fere 
no emasculation by idealization as have our own dandi~ie 
cowboys, was an Argentine ranch hand whose two possessio 
o~ value were his kni~e and his horse. His relation to 
the caudillo was a close equivalent to that his conti-
nental ancestors had held in the 12th century to their 
1 
local liege-lord. AS Argentina changed ~rom viceroyalt 
to nation, the caudillo, caught in the grip o~ a 
so~tening civilization, metamorphosed to hacendado and 
the ga~cho, dealt with more harshly by the same process, 
became the landless peon still devoted to his master, 
still serving him with unquestioning loyalty. 
1. Rowe, L.s., The Federal Siste~ ~ the Argentine 
Republic, Washington, 1921, ch. iii. 
The Argentine revolution o~ 1810, like that o~ the 
United States in 1776, was more economic than social; it 
centered upon the opening o~ Argentine ports to all 
commerce. hen, upon reception o~ the news o~ Napoleon's 
2 
conquest o~ Spain Viceroy Cisneros was replaced by a 
junta gpbernativa, the earliest Platan diplomacy was co~ 
prised o~ Buenos Aires' attempt to create political and 
commercial relations with ~oreign governments and 
neighboring provinces. 
3 
The declaration o~ political independence did not 
materially alter the domestic economy o~ the land; it did 
mean, however, less drainage o~ La Platan wealth to Europe 
4 
via Spain. The neu· national constitution amounted in 
substance to a Spanish translation o~ the constitution 
adopted some thirty years previously by the United states. 
2. In 1808-Napoleon conquered the Iberian peninsula and 
deposed Ferdinand VII, King o~ Spain and the Indies. In 
place o~ the legitimate monarch Napoleon enthroned his own 
brother. 
3. The declaration o~ independence o~ Las Provincias 
Unidas en Sud-Am~rica was made at Saint-michael o~ Tuc~n 
on JulY.~' 1816. The text o~ the declaration is ~ound in ~ pol{tica exterior de la RepUblica Argentin~, (Centro 
de estudios de derecho internacional p6blico), Buenos 
Aires, 1931, pp. 237-239. 
4. Robertson, •r • s., "The Beginnings o~ Spanish American 
Diplomacy," Essays in American History Dedicated to 
Frederick Jackson Turner, New York, 1910, pp. 231=236. 
7 
o~ the relation o~ this ~act to the development or the rol 
5 
or the hacendado, one Argentine writer interestingly notes' 
that the new constitution due to its source embodies the 
liberal thou~ht or the ~n~lisb revolution or the 17th 
century and the French revolution or the 18th century. In 
a manner reminiscent or Yale's late Carl Becker, he points I 
out that the guarantee or individualism thus provided 
gives the "robber-baron type" a rree hand to help hin1self 
to the good things or the nation and to rorm the p olitical 
6 
and economic pattern to suit his own convenience. 
Throughout the colonial period and that of the 
7 
epublic until the time or Juan Manuel de ~osas, the 
excellence a nd rertility or the Argentine pampas meant 
little. Land as cheap; and since it was as fluid as rnone 
5. The term hacendado has been selected ror principal use 
to specify the large land owner and rancher upon the 
original recommendation of Dr. G· n. Howard. Writers in 
the field more often use estanciero or latifundista lithout 
any apparent discrimination in meaning. Strictly speaking 
the estanciero is a relatively small farmer, the h~cendado 
a large land holder and rancher or even planter, and the 
latirundista an owner of vast tra cts or uncultivated or 
poorly-cUitivated land. 
6. orfa, Jorge s ., Problemas de econom{a social, Buenos 
Aires, 1937, P• 146 rf. 
7. Juan .~nuel de Rosas served as Governor of the Province 
of Buenos Aires from 1829 to 1834. After a brief interim 
o~ desert fighting a gainst t he I ndians, he returned and 
established himsel~ as dictator ~rom 183~ to 18fi~. I n 
Argentina the last two decades of the first hal~ or the 
nineteenth century were full or anarchy, despotism, and 
violence• The rabulous tale of Rosas is round in Levene, 
Joaquin v., Lecciones de historia argep~j~, Buenos ires, 
19?.0 , v. 2, PP• 30 ~~. 
but safer, it became a political weapon of reward or 
punishment. It bought support for or opposition to a 
8 
social leader. 
With the opening to connnerce of the port of Buenos 
8 
Aires a new significance came to the e;eography and pattern 
of settlement of Argentina. Spanish colonial policy had 
left its mark, for colonization had been possible by only 
three routes: (l) the Atlantic and the P{o de la Plata, 
9 
(2) from Alto Peru along the old Inca highways, and 
(3) from hile into the province of r.uyo. As trade was 
not permitted along the Atlantic coast, the :rertile pampas 
were develnped frnm the west rriving early predominance to 
such cities as Tucum~n, c 6rdoba, San Juan, and Jujuy. 
Af'ter independence and its resultant opening of the port 
of the city of Buenos Aires, the capitol grew in utter 
disre~ard of the previously esta blished centers of the 
nation into a sprawling city embodying one fifth of the 
10 
population of the entire republic. This inversion has 
developed a nation of three distinct concentric zones 
centered around Buenos Aires. These show the demographic 
ll 
disequilibrium of the Argentine nation. 
8. Rennie~,----sibel F·, The Argenti~ R,epublic, New York, 
194!'5, P• 69. 
9. The old Spanish name for the land that is modern Boliv a. 
10 . Wilgus, 11- Curtis, The Development _o% ]Ii_s_panic Americ , 
Nelv York, 1941, pp. 240-243. See visual representation of 
early settlements on page 30. 
11. The significance or the concentration of Arg ntina's 
life blood is iven visual r 
page 20. 
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The ~irst zone comprises the 20~ o~ the nation's total 
land which immediately surrounds the capitol with a radius 
or some 200 miles. In this area lives 67~ of the 
popula tion; in it is 86~ o~ the cultivation o~ grains and 
~ruit trees, o3~ 0~ the c~ ttle, 461o or the sheep, 77~ 0~ 
the pork, 54~ o~ the railways, 71~ of the telephones, 79( 
o~ the automobiles, and 78~ of the invested industrial and 
mining capital of the nation. 
The second zone contains 40~ of the national territory 
(running from the boundary of zone one to a boundary with 
a r a dius of some 600 miles from the capitol). This area, 
twice as larg·e a s the rirst, has 2not of the population, lldl, 
o~ the grain and fruit cultivation, 27~ o~ the cattle, 18( 
of the sheep, 1~~ of the pork, 28~ of the telephones, 29~ 
o~ the railways, 16~ of the automobiles, a nd 11~ of the 
invested industri£" 1 Pnd mining capital o·r the n Ation. 
The third zone comprises a ll territory beyond the 600 
mile radius from the city of Buenos Aires. It is the same 
size as zone two, comprising 4 01o o~ the national territory. 
Only 8~ of the population lives there, and there are found I 
within the area 13% of the cultivation of grains and fruits 
101o of the cattle, 36~ o~ the sheep, 7~ of the pork, 17( 
of the railways, ~~ of the automobiles, 11o of the telephone~, 
I 
10 
and 11~ o~ the invested industrial and mining capital o~ 
12 
the nation. This distribution or economic and demo-
graphic values is partially the cause and partially the 
result or the hacendado and, either way, thoroughly 
agreeable to his interests. 
iluenos Aires, which was rrom the outset the 
intellectual center or the country, took the lead in the 
13 
revolution. The portenos alone possessed the sel~-
confidence a nd military experience derived ~rom the 
expulsion or British invasions o~ 1806 and 18u7, and the 
hinterlands did not particularly reel the oppression o~ th 
ineptly wielded Spanish rule. As the power of uenos Aire 
rose the power of the northwest declined because of its 
inability to compete economically with the great port . Bu 
the economic dominance or the portenos did not bring 
immediate political dominance. The proud old cities o~ th 
interior rerused to bow politically. TIThereas during the 
overthrow of the viceroy and the expulsion o~ the Spanish 
troops the towns had 'orked together to attain independenc , 
12. tlunge, 1 lejandro ·' ., ~ :ueva Argentina, Buenos Aire , 
1940, PP• 22~224 . cr . Taylor, Carl c., Rural Life in 
Argenti~ , Baton Rouge, 1948, pp. 66-n9. 
Dr. Taylor's material and supplementary statistics 
are based upon two articles in Ar gentine periodicals of 
1939 and 1941 in which Bunge apparently made use of the 
same analysis he elaborated in ~is 1940 volume. 
13. A term applied to the residents of the port city o~ 
~uenos Aires , and more loosely to the province. 
11 
now each import nt tofn assumed authority over a large 
section o~ surrounding territory and ~ormed an autonomous 
provincial government. The Junta ~ Reyresentantes set up 
by the revolution was essentially a symbol o~ social and 
14 
racial, not political unity. 
~ rom the beginning o~ the republic both the unitarian 
and ~ ·ederalist ~actions recognized that the problem o~ 
building either a united or ~ederal Argentine nation was 
directly linked with the peoplin~ o~ the pampas. The early 
presidents, lberdi, _ itre, barmiento, sought by law ~rom 
the beginning under the slogan " Gobernar ~ poblar," to 
encourage colonization o~ the interior and aided by every 
means possible the ~oundation o~ the large estates. This 
type o~ primitive agrarian political planning eommon to the 
republics o~ southern South America resulted in the 
Argentine latifundio, the l...ihilean fundo, and the Br a zilian 
:fazenda. J. n the century ~ollmving Alberdi the Argentine 
national government served the hacendado interests blindly 
~or they were the government. The workers in the :field 
were politically incapable o:f demanding distribution o:f the 
15 
land that they might have homes o:f their own. 
~4. Rowe, loc-. cit. 
15. Dichrroann, Enrique, "Inmigraci6n y lati:fundio", ~evista 
Argentine de Uiencias Pol{ticas, Ano v, Torno x , 1915, 
N'GOm. 56,· p'j}. 16()-166. 
12 
With the corning o~ Fosas the vast central plains 
which remained national property were transferred into 
private hands as quickly as it could be done· He gave 
land to himsel~ and to his soldiers, and he doubled its 
16 
rental th2 t the lessees might be rorced to buy. 
osas undertook extensive campaigns against the 
Indians, which were supported both in the legislature and 
in the field by the hacendados, ror they knew that they 
were to reap the chie~ gains o~ these campaigns. .Appro-
priation s ror t he ~inan ,ing of ~ndian expeditions were 
supported with an ardor lacking to measures proposing 
expansion or a riculture. L'he hacendados, who were the 
only important tenants or buyers or public domain, ~elt 
that large scale agricultural or pastoral colonization 
~rom abroad might adversely a~rect their land holding 
interests as ambitious European immigrants would aspire to 
17 
~arms o~ their own. Throughout this whole period land 
was given by the ~overnment to the hacendado with such 
abandon that in 1885, when the Conquest o~ the Desert was 
complete and the nation wished to reward its heroes ~or 
their valiant work, the Iinistry o~ Agriculture round that 
the government bad given away more than 2U5, 000,000 acres 
o~ land and bad no idea as to what lands were left, where 
16. {ennie, o~ cit., p. 71. 
17. Hurgin, ryron, " he .economic :\Spects .2.f. Argentine 
r ederation 182 -18n2~Harvard Economic Studies vol. 
LXX.VI IT , - Cambridge, .rass. 1946, p. 24. 
13 
they were, or what they were worth. 
From 1810 until the rail or Rosas in 18n2, and in 
ract until the more settled conditions or the 1870 's, the 
political tension and turmoil or Argentina was so great 
that European immigration was almost nil despite the 
various plans ror colonization that were undertaken. Thus 
even the unsettled political situation and the civil war 
19 
conspired to aid the ends or the hacendados. 
Prior to the time of Rosas cattle had been raised 
principally for their hides. It was not until after 1R3n, 
20 
when ~ osas and his partners built the rirst saladero in 
Buenos Aires, that beer, the latter-day source of 
Argentine wealth, had value and that land value increased 
because of the importance or grazing. But because the 
strong brine destroys the nutritive value of the beef, 
salted meat while increasing the beef market did not find 
a large continental demand. Vhile the saladero was a 
forward step it was not the solution for getting Argentine 
beef to the foreign market. It did, however, by increasin 
the value of grazing land which must be held in vast tract , 
21 
give added impetus to the maintenance or large estates. 
18. Rennie, op. cit., P• 141. 
19. Dickmann, 1:2.£. ill• 
20. A Spanish term meaning literally "salting place". 
These were large, carelessly constructed sheds of three or 
rour rooms in which slaughtering, quartering, salting, and 
orten storage might take place. 
21. Rennie, 2-E• cit., p. 67-68. 
14 
It is not difficult to understand how, with the 
hacendado in full political control, the national econo1nic 
theory identified the interests of the grazing industry 
with those of the nation; that which was for the good of 
the hacendado was considered to be good for the nation as a 
22 
whole, therefore it was good for its several parts. 
Argentine land owning cattle raisers were by the middle of 
the nineteenth century a well-established, politically 
dominant, local aristocracy of substantial wealth. Then 
the technique of refrigeration was developed and overnight 
the hacendado became an elite group among the peoples of 
the world with such wealth that they could bribe the wheels 
of time, holding back the "century of the Common Man" in 
their homeland for nearly fifty years. 
During the 19th century, as the cattle on the pampas 
multiplied, the value of the land went forward apace• Land 
that was worth 6~0 pesos in 1836 bought as high as sixteen 
thousand pesos by 1867. The landowners had simply to let 
time pass to realize a fabulous capital increase. Naturall 
in such a situation landowners did not alienate their domai , 
and as the government was under their control they were not 
forced to sell any part of it. The hacendado had nature on 
his side. Despite the fact that scientific breeding and 
agriculture were ignored, mere quantity of land and cattle 
22. Burgin, ~· cit., p. 256. 
Hi 
·z3 
combined to produce wealth. A society somewhat like thatl 
o~ the ante-bellum south in the heyday oT the cotton 
24 
plantation was the result. 
Landownership, now more than a matter of social pres-
tige, was a commercial and industrial enterprise in which 
the older feudal class emerged as a truly agrarian class 
and as a nascent class of capitalists. The transition took 
place first in the coastal province o~ Buenos Aires as its 
situation gave it the greatest commercial advantage. Bit 
25 
by bit the transformation spread inland. 
The easy riches supplied by a bountiful nature did not 
bring to the class that enjoyed these fruits a feeling o~ 
particular responsibility to the nation. That the result 
was a group of expatriates in outlook, culture, and 
intellectual orientation is a matter properly treated in a 
later chapter. 
Land was the source of wealth in the Argentine. 
Prestige is an adjunct of wealth. It is only natural that 
supported by land-\feal th 1vhen the Argentine economy chan~ed 
~rom the feudal to the modern, the hacendado was able to 
maintain his national social dominance. 
The hacendados make their homes on estancias ranging 
~rom 15,000 to 150,000 acres or more. In the center o~ 
23. Rennie,~· cit., p. 72-73. 
24. Weil, Felix J., Argentine Riddle, New York, 1944. p. 2 
2n. Burgin, £E• cit., P• 30. C~. Ingenieros, Jose, 
Sociolog{a Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1918, p. 62 ~f. 
these estates amid well tended lawns and gardens several 
acres in extent their beautifUlly kept mansions stand in 
1 
isolated splendor. The hacendados, mannequins of fashion 
in their London tweeds and Paris dresses, occasionally spen 
short seasons on their land between trips abroad or more 
fashionable residence in the capitol city. / To the peon who 
rarely saw ~ senores, they were a world apart• This clas 
separation was accentuated by the fact that the absenteeism 
of the owners usually conTronted the peon with an inter-
mediary, the manager of the estate, from whom the pe6n 
received his orders and who supervised his work. That the 
hacendado was free of even the duty of governing his estate 
fUrther elevated his position and prestige in the eyes or 
the pe6n. It is not only these exceptional privileges whic 
marked the hacendados as different; there were more fUnda-
mental distinctions. To the pe6n working on the estancia, 
even the ability of the hacendado to live normally with his 
family is a mark of distinction, for there was no place for 
the family of the pe6n on the estancia and his sex life and 
26 
family life were both unstable as a result. 
As if these factors were not enough to insure an 
unapproachable prestige to the landed aristocracy, there 
remains the fact that throughout the history of the 
• 
26. Justo, Juan B., Discursos z escritos polfticos, Buenos 
Aires, 1933, p. 150. 163. 
17 
Argentine nation the affairs of state have been almost 
exclusively in the hands of the hacendados or those of 
their representatives. Urquiza, president of the republic 
in the middle of the 19th century, according to a traveler 
who was his guest had a mansion that could accomodate nOO 
persons. It was magnificently furnished and set amid 
beautiful lawns. In addition, at Concepcion del Uruguay 
he possessed a saladero; subseQuently he established 
27 
several others. Differences of interests that were 
represented in the national government were differences of 
regional groups 1vi thin the same oligarchy; such 1vas the 
28 
significance or political parties. Although Urquiza was 
rrom Entre Rios, the pattern he represents is identical 
with that or the hacendados of the pampas or Buenos Aires 
province. 
Although a middle class of well-to-do industrialists 
and tradesmen grew up along with the increase or the 
capitol city, their affluence in no way challenged the 
social, economic, or political standing of the land owning 
families. "Land and all that relates to it is the warp an 
woor or the fabric of Argentine society. Social prestige 
is commensurate with the amount or land owned. Even a 
millionaire, if landless, is considered outside the pale." 
27. Koebel, W. H., The Romance or the River Plate, London, 
1914, v. 2, PP• 489-491. - --
28. In~enieros, op. cit., p. 64. 
18 
Obviously geographical, historical, economic, and 
social ~actors conspire with the process o~ land aggrandiz& 
ment ror an unbalanced economy in Argentina. From be~ore 
the birth o:f the Argentine nation into the :fi~th decade o~ 
the 20th century the control or Argentine li:fe has been in 
the hands or a very :fe·w people. Kostzer, writing in 194~ 
shows the signiricance o~ such an economy and the 
:10 
precarious thread by which it hangs: 
En epocas de normalidad, la exportaci6n argentina 
se basa en los productos agropecuarios, de cuyo total, 
cerca del 83% lo constituyen seis productos: ma!z, 
trigo, carnes, lino, lanas y cueros que juntos con la 
/ 
manteca, queso, case1na, :fruta y vino hacen llegar la 
exportaci6n de productos agropecuarios al 96~ del 
total. La exportaci6n representa el puntal de la 
polftica econ6mica argentina, pues signi:fica el 3~~ 
de la produccion del pa{s y asentada en las ~randes 
cirras de un n6mero li~itado de art{culos, porcentaje 
que muestra la situacion de nependencia con respecto 
al exterior y que en epocas de crisis mundiales, los 
acontecimientos repercuten intensamente en su 
estructura econ6mica, por la :falta de colocacion de 
los grandes saldos exportables. 
/ "/ La pol1tica economica argentina solo ha 
ravorecido los intereses agropecuarios del litoral, 
en perjuicio del desarrollo y progreso de las diversas , 
regiones del pa1s •••• 
Further on in his study, Kostzer shows the 
responsi 1ility o:f the hacendado ror the unbalanced economy 
31 
which has stemmed :from the pattern o:f land aggrandizement: 
~0. Kostzer, Mois~s, "Las Investil!:aciones economicas 
regionales", Sustancia, Ano IV, nos. 1;-16, 1943, p. 711. 
31. Ibid., pp. 712-713. Kostzer cites, ror statisti.cal 
corroboration o~ the analysis, Pena Guzman, Solano, La 
autarqu:la ~ l a Econom:la Argentina, Tucun~n, 1942. -
19 
La pol{tica econ6mica argentina, dirigida, por 
el litoral, ni siquiera ha podido dar una situaci~n 
de solidez a la clase agra ria, si se tiene en cuenta 
el bajo porcentaje de propietarios existentes en las 
provincias de mayor producci6n; en e~ecto, Buenos 
Aires ~igura con el 30% de propietarios, COrdoba con 
el 44~, Santa Fe con el 32~ y Entre R{os con el 4?~ 
de propietarios. Y es que la pol{tica econ6mica del 
litoral y el problema del l a tirundio son hechos J 
conexos, si se consideran las grandes sumas d e dinero 
que anualmente pagan los productores en concepto de 
arrendamiento. / 
La capacidad economica de las provincias y 
territorios argentinos, muestra el gran dese~uilibrio 
existente entre las diversas regiones del pa1s •••• 
The very agrarian concentration lVhich permitted the 
hacendado to delay the "Century o~ the Common 1\Ian" ~our 
and a hal~ decades, in time o~ lVOrld crises caused the 
collapse o~ his sys~em in the year in which Kostzer writes 
By 1946 Peron, speaking in behal~ o~ the workers and 
acting in behal~ o~ industria l interests, could o~~icially 
take over the reins o~ the government he had come 
increasingly to control since the coup d'etat o~ 1~43. 
The Concentration o~ Argentina's Resources 
I 
II 
III 
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II. Why this study dates from 1877: the role of the 
hacendado in Argentina before 1R77. 
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The hacendado did not, as Pallas Athene, spring full 
blown from the brow of Zeus. Apart from mythology, humble 
beginnings and slow growth in formation must precede the 
mature result. The Argentine hacendado is no exception; 
his social, economic, and political status are the result 
of a gradual evolution. 
Even in the process of evolution, however, there are 
certain lines of demarcation that signify the passing from 
one stage to another; these boundary evidences of growth 
permit us to typify the stages between them. This techniq e 
shall be used in tracing the development of the hacendado, 
so tl~t it may be apparent that 1877 is the logical year 
in which to begin our survey of the role of a mature land-
owing society in Argentina. 
Within the body of the Spanish colonial society of 
the Viceroyalty of La Plata the foetus of the mature 
hacendado structure lay complete in all its parts, though 
unformed. Colonial society held at its apex the Spanish 
expatriate, born in the motherland, who came to the 
provinces for a few years to conduct the affairs of His 
Catholic Majesty, to pursue his private business, or 
merely to make his fortune. Entree to this group was 
comprised of good birth in Spain, having come from Spain 
22 
oneself, and an intention to return home when the purpose 
for which one had come was completed. 
Obviously with such rigid requirements for top-rate 
social standing, the simple fact of birth in the New orld 
instead of the Old would disqualify a man. It did. It 
labeled him as a criollo. Some criollos had a good bit of 
money, for their fathers had been wise investors in land 
and cattle and had decided to stay in the Nelv World rather 
than return home. Some criollos came from noble Spanish 
blood, though this was less common as the nobles 
systematically returned to the court society of the Old 
World which was more able to please their tastes. 
Most of the leading criollo families lived like feuda~ 
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daimyo upon their estates from which their wealth was 
derived. As these were isolated like 12th century castles 
with clustering villages of peo~sabout them, it was only 
natural that the criollo, living so removed from the 
enlightened peoples of 17th and 18th century Europe, 
developed ways and manners that made him seem a wild and 
native Argentine rustic. These men were the caudillos, 
strong men of the Argentine plains comparable to the best 
Commodore Vanderbilt or early- :Uorgan tradition. They 
32. The daimyo comprised Japan's feudal class• They held 
large tracts of land which were worked by serfs. From the 
wealth of the rice production they were enabled to live in 
princely homes and maintain their private armies of samurai. 
Theirs was a position less exalted than the royal family or 
the shogunate, the hereditary administrators for the royal 
family, but the daimyo, like the Argentine criollo, 
carried an operative feudal structure into modern times. 
23 
combined energy, courage, a nd adventurous spirit to 
maintain their estancias in the Indian-infested wilderness 
The benefits of wealth and influence that their heirs 
reaped were equivalent to those reaped by the heirs of 
their North American counterparts. 
Criollos owned land--the first apparent element in 
the embryonic hacendado structure. Secondly, their social 
status was beneath only that of the representatives of the 
mother country. Thirdly, their political stature, least 
obvious of all in the embryonic state, was getting its 
basic form on the municipal level. 
The slow gestation was quickened suddenly by events 
in Europe. Napoleon conquered Spain and set his brother 
on the Spanish throne. Although the La Platans forced 
Viceroy El{o to recognize the rights of the young king, 
Fe~dinand VII, thoughts of independence were already well-
33 
formed in their minds. That La Plata took the 
initiative in this revolt of the Spanish colonies in the 
Nelv World was not accidental; it alone had self- confidence 
and experience, derived from earlier defense against 
French and English invasions, which the criollos used to 
gain the political offices and rights which had long been 
their due by law. Although the laws of Spain had declared 
Spaniards and criollos to enjoy political eouality in the 
33. Colecci6n de tra~ados celebrados po( la Reptiblica 
Argentina ~ las naciones extranjeras, Publicaci6n 
oficial) Buenos Aires, 1R~3, pp. fi-9. 
colonies, only 18 or the 748 orricials appointed in the 
~4 
colonial period had been criollos. 
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It was these criollos who in May or 1810 rorced the 
Spanish city council or Buenos Aires to relinquish the 
government to them and thus started the movement or inde-
pendence. / It was their deputies who met at 'T'ucuman in 181 
and declared the United Provinces or South America 
independent or Spain . It was the criollos who presided at 
the birth or the Argentine nation, working it in their own 
image and, thererore, launching themselves on the second 
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distinct phase or their evolution. 
In the phase or national independence the caudillos, 
assuming the role or government rormerly held by the 
Spanish hirelings, assumed also many or his civilized 
graces. The transition, however, rrom ranch to gentleman 
was a gradual one covering the whole period o~ the civil 
insurrections. We observe meanwhile that even as his soci 
position is enhanced with the liquidation or the previous! 
privileged group, the political and economic role or the 
ranch owner increases proportionately. 
lt is true that in the rirst halr-century of 
independence the hacendados quarrelled in a series or civi 
34. Wilgus , 2.E· cit., pp. 240. 
~5. , itre, Bartolome, Historia de .elgrano X la 
indepen~~ncia arffientina, Buenos Aires, 1887, v. 2, p. 418. 
wars over the use of the political power. et this must 
not be construed to m an that they ere in disa~reement 
about their class rights and privileges . fts the feudal 
lords who fought one ?nothPr in ~urope in the centuries 
preccaing , they quarrelled on neither convictions Por 
36 
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principles. ., he prime political wran.D"le was the nuestion 
of a united ~overnment or federation of semi-autonomous 
states. ~'he hacendado of r1uenos Aires prov ·nee f'ouP"ht for 
a system of government in which imports, ex orts, navi-
o-ation, co!Jlmercial lalf, money , ann f'oreirn relations ould 
in a unified natlon represent their interests. . hese 
porte~os were opposed ~y their counterparts in the 
provinces who sought to maintain the autonomy of the 
provinces ~nd thus adapt the government to the particular 
37 
interest of the ruling group in each. lt is a measure of 
strength of the hacendado o.r the rich .menos ires 1~rovince 
pampas that, despite the formation by la nf' a feder~ted ~ 
38 
government, the interpreted crrect of the constitution 
36. ..acdonald, Austin •., overnrnent of th!! ft_rgentin.e 
epublic, New York, 1942, pp. 93-94. 
:17. '·ddone, Jacinto , rn f, ctor econ6mico en nuestras 
luchas civiles, Buenosl\ires, l937 , pp . 2~9-27f . 
~8. The creation of 8 rederr.l system of ~overnment vas 
proclaimed in 18~3 by a constitution subscribed by the 
prcvinces convC'ned at ;:,anta j e. Huenos Aires province 
remained aloof fro~ this arranFement until 18Rt l , hen it 
joined the federation. 1. he membership of' ,uenos Aires did 
not solve the tensions, howevC'r, .nd ~f'ter the B. ttle of 
~avon i, 18R1 the provinces once again had to resign 
themselves to hUenos .il ires dominance . 
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hns been essentially unitarian. 
2A 
r ot only did the hacendado economic concept in:fluence 
the political scene ; it had a power:ful repction upon the 
social picture. 1he holding o:f lar~e tr,cts o:f land :for 
the ~razing o:f cattle kept down the number o:f independent 
owners and cultivators; this meant a sparce population o:f 
peones in the pa n1pa~ in place of Tlumerous, independent 
4 
small :farmers, and easier control by the hr>cendado . 
In Ar~entina, more than in any other nation, land has 
been essentially a basis of commerce aT1d speculation . It 
has been and is held in a crudely commercial sense, :for it 
has been the source o:f ft rgentina's great :fortunes. ~ith 
the comin~ of the rai lroads its value incrensed by leaps 
and bounds; the discovery o:f the princi les o:f refri~erati n 
skyrocketed lend values further. ret ith the rapid 
increase o:f land value, the men who controlled it did not 
cha11p.:e their social outlook t ward it but ren:arcled it in 
the spme ] i~ht as when it was overrun by J ndians aml out o 
touch with the orld. A r~entine ~overnors , bankers, and 
busiTlessmen have always thought o:f land in no other terms 
than as an investment. rhey do not consider its social 
value as homesteads, but simply its use in large plots, 
41 
rather than small, :for pro:fit. 
39. '!'his was-achieved by interpretation o:f the right o:f 
the :federal ~overnment to intervene in the a:f:fairs o:f the 
provinces in order to assure democrntic provincial 
government. uUCh a procedure Of intervention Upheld by th 
Supreme uourt could not :fail to give the :federal 
government complete control. 
41. tiUn n:e , J\le.iandro , . • , 2.E· ~·, p. ~2Q. 
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Thus in his second phase o:r evolutlon the caudillo 
became the estanci~, the hacendado. ~n the :fullness o:f 
time the wealth o:f his land and the value of the cattle 
thereon increased. As legatee of the ~berian in both 
social and political life the hacendado has had no trouble 
forming the national life to a convenient pattern. l he 
creature filled out its form that vas but su':!--;ested in 
embryo. ~he pattern was set, but the domination o:r 
Argentina by the hacendado ~as in this second phase a 
moderate omination, ~or he yet lacked the technical means 
o:r incre-sing his wealth which was shortly g iven him. 
When technology also began to serve him, the ~ap between 
the hacendado and the rest of' his countrymen was quick ly 
widened and he was assured a control o:r national af:fairs 
that remained unchallenged for two-thirds of' a century. 
In the 19th century the Industrial Revolution 
radically altered the complexion of' uropean and American 
society. The :factors of' production :fell into the hands of' 
energetic business men who, on t h e whole, were not iden-
tif'ied with the previous, f'eudal ruling class. ·•'hat part 
of' the bcne:fits o:f the i ndustrial P.evolution which altered 
the techniques of' production in the Argentine nation, 
namely t e railroads and re:frigeration, were of' immediate 
and prime use to the hacendados who had already inherited 
and entrenched themselves in the dominant position 
socially, economically, and politically . 
c uisition of reat wealth 
'£hese inventions 
as the 
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industrial age did in eneral, but in Argentina the result 
was a great increase in the wealth or those who were 
alrecdy wealthy; therefore instead or a dynamic change in 
society, Argentina experienced a crystalization of the 
alrea dy establisherl system. r he hacendado became more 
than an agricultural baron; he became a land-owning 
industrialist producing beef on a tremendous scale for 
continental consumption. 
the termination by u eneral ~oca in 1870 or the war 
against the Indians, which had been begun by osas in the 
1830's, opened the pampas to the railroads. The railroads 
built chiefly by British investment, permitted the shipmen 
of beef to the metropolis and made the wide occupation and 
42 
use of the pampas for cattle raising possible. hen the 
railroads were followed by the construction of meat-packin 
plants, the aristocracy had simply to hold their land to 
reap immense profits. In the seventy years following 
43 
1857, the value of land increased 30,000~. 
Thus 1877, the year in which the first successful 
shipment of .A rgentine beef to '' urope was made aboarcl a 
refrigerating ship, is the beginning of the third and 
greatest phase in the evolution of the hacendado. I t is 
the start or the new era in which a brand of Argentine 
unknown before (not unknown in kind but in degree) came 
into being. 
42 • . artlnez, Albert B., and Lewandowski, Maurice, The 
Argentine in the Twentieth .~.~~_!?tur.;v ew v ork, 1911, p:-4fl. 
43. • 97. 
l'his hacendad~ group, whose power from this time brooks 
no rival, whose control of the economic life of the nation 
made it a true oligarchy, is a genus homo to be well 
appraised. Desce~dant of the broad pampas, he does not care 
:for rigid order, justice, a.uthority. He has been enriched 
almost without effort by the bounty of the land and o:f nature 
He moves tenants off the land to mare r 0 om ~o r more cattle as 
meat prices go up. The resultant overabundant supply of 
4:=i 
chea.p l abor in t h e cities is of no importa nce to him. Any 
act is just as long as he makes money. He controls the 
government in order to assure that truth, for as Thra.syrnachus 
says in The Republic, Justice is nothing more or less than 
the interests of the stronger. The hacendado is a unique 
phenomenon in the 19th and 20th centuries. A clear picture 
and evaluation of this phenomenon is our goal. 
44. Ibid., P• 80. 
45. G'lvez, Manuel, Este pueblo necesita, Buenos Aires, 1934 
PP• 99, 110. 
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Settlements Be~ore 1600 
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III. The geographic latifundio and the latirundio social; 
the ethnocentrism and class aspect or the 
hacendado. 
The latifundio is by definition a vast tract of 
land that is little or poorly cultivated. It is an 
economic and social phenomenon that requires both vast 
areas and a small population for its existence. The 
concentration of Argentina's population in its few 
cities--more than one-fifth of the national population 
resides in the city or Buenos Aires--leaves the nation's 
expansive plains sparsely settled. This is, however, no 
accident, for from the earliest times forces were at 
work to prevent the settling and homesteading of the 
pampas in a manner similar to that which took place i n 
the American West. 
Colonization never played the role in Spanish 
colonial enterprise that it did in the English and 
French. Exploitation of the Spanish provinces of the 
New World did not carry as an inevitable corollary 
systematic settlement of the land. Occa sionally attempt~ 
at settlement were made in the early years of the 
Argentine republic. As the attempts were half-hearted 
and not encouraged in practice by the government which 
truly represented the conflicting interest or the large 
land holder, attempts in most instances were shortly 
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abandoned. 
During the tyranny or Rosas in the fourth and fifth 
decades or the 19th century, immigration was impeded by 
unsettled conditions as certainly as it was by law in 
colonial times; therefore, it was not until after the fall 
or Rosas in February or 1852, that any sizeable influx or 
Europeans into the La Platan republic took place• By the 
time or this latter-day influx, the pattern or lan~ 
ownership in Argentina was already well-crystallized; the 
rich and easily accessible pampas or Buenos Aires Province 
had been in the hands or a rew hacendados ror more than a 
47 
century. 
While not all the lands in the public domain had been 
seized prior to the arrival of post-Rosas colonists, by 
various legal means or just plain force the powerful 
hacendados had appropriated the public lands in great 
tracts and had reduced the gauchos upon it to veritable 
peonage. What little land remained was so expensive and at 
such distance from civilization and communication that the 
new immigrant for the most part could not avail himself of 
48 
it. 
The vast holdings of the Argentine hacendado are not 
easy to catalogue. As the great landowners, who would not 
46. Jefferson, Mark, Peopling the Argentine Pampa, The 
American Geographical Society, New York, 1926, P• 36 ff. 
47. Rennie, ~· cit., p. 13n. 
48. Dickmann, ~· cit., pp. 162-163. 
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care :for the public to know how much is owned by hmv :rew, 
ha ve had control o:r the government -- and there:rore o:r the 
census -- statistical in:rormation is not easily available. 
As late as 1942, however, it was demonstrated that more 
than 250 individuals held properties o:r more than 47, 000 
acres each and that 41 corporations, which were o:ften 
comprised o:f a single :ramily estate, avera~ed 63, 000 acres 
As the signi:ricance o:r this concentration o:f landownership 
is considered, it is easy to see why 60~ o:r Argentine 
:rarming is done by tenant :rarmers at the pleasure o:r the 
patriarchal social organization o:r the vast landed 
49 
estates. 
At just what point the size o:r a property is su:r:ricie t 
to classi:ry it as a lati:rundio, none o:r the Argentine 
economists would venture to say. The precise line o:r 
de:rinition is impossible to draw, :ror there are other 
considerations than that the property has merely overgrown 
an acreage lvhich might be called that o:r an estancia • 
~ocation and accessibility are important. A property o:r 
2,500 to 5,000 acres some leagues :rrom a railway station 
might be rated only as a substantial estancia, whereas the 
same property easily accessible in a more populous area 
thus bringing into sharper relief' the unnatural concen-
tration o:f land control -- might well rate as a l a tif'undio 
There may be a latif'undio social as well as a geographical 
lati:rundio, since the concept is centered upon the quantit 
49. Greenu 
o~ land controlled by one man, one ramily, or one corpor-
ation. The owner of a number or sizeable smaller 
properties, none o~ which may be a lati~undio o~ itself, i 
a latif'undista just as surely in his social-economic 
control of a large area as the man who owns the same total 
!10 
acreage in one continuous area. While there are many 
holdings o~ one piece lar.ge enough to qualify as 
latifundios, the lati~undl£ social in recent years has 
become the more common. 
The peonage of the once ~ree gaucho is a li~e near th~ 
minimum level of subsistence. As a result there is a con-
siderable flow of population from the rural areas to the 
cities. The life o~ the unskilled laborer in the cities i 
by no means high, but despite long hours and low pay the 
urhan l aborer hc s a freedom in his living fhich is unrnown 
. ;' 
to the peon on the rural estate. Although the urban birth-
rate is very low and the rural birthrate high, Argentine 
cities have increased rapidly in population, while the 
51 
rural population has remained practically static. 
The social consequences are practically identical 
whether the latifundio is a single holding or a string of 
properties. While the latifundio social is deceptive 
because it is less conspicuous, it is possible that a 
~o. Bunge, £E• cit., p. 332. 
51. Ibid., p. 334. 
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colono ousted rrom one esta ncia of a family might find 
refuge on another belonging to the same ramily under a 
difrerent administrator. On the geographical latirundio 
the fate or the colono is in the hands of the overlord 
every bit as much as it was in feudal times. 
Neither does the social impact or the latirundio vary 
depending upon the type or ownership. The social 
consequences are the same ir the latifundio is owned by 
one person , a man and his immediate ramily, or ir it is 
incorporated and has come to be held by several people 
with little or vague ramily connection. If anything, the 
,I 
rate of the peon and colono may be worse in the instance 
of corporate control, as even the element or benevolent 
paternalism may be lacking in the impersonal corporate 
enterprise. In any instance, the l a tifundio is the 
leviathan or land control and has in it the dangers to the 
individual always found in large-scale organization. 
52. A term applied in Argentina to those who rarm a part 
of an estancia under a percentage- o:r- crop agreement with 
the owner. While his position might appear superior to 
that or the pe6n who works as a ranch hand, there is no 
reason for such a conclusion. The colono may be rorced 
to move with no compunction at any time the owner or 
manager or the estate decides to use the tract or land the 
colono was rarming ror something else. The ranch pe6n, 
on the other hand, is generally considered a permanent 
member or the establishment. He is not, as the colono, 
under the constant threat or the loss or his home . 
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Even in the 20th century the large estates have con-
tinued to add sizeable tracts o~ land to their holdings; 
~ewer people own more o~ the land than ever be~ore. In 
the "century o~ the Common Man" when the social developmen 
o~ the world has directed its attention to the wel~are o~ 
the less economically secure segment o~ society, the 
anomaly o~ the lati~ndista is strikingly apparent. The 
hacendados are aware o~ their vestigial nature in today's 
social organism and ~eel an insecurity that is a recent 
addition to their psychology. The political and social 
mani~estations o~ this will be discussed in a later 
chapter, but it is o~ importance to note here that as a 
result o~ this new insecurity even less in~ormation as to 
hacendado holdings ha s been available since 1930 than the 
were willing to make available in the year 1914. 
The lati~ndio has become a state vithin a state, 
ze8lously guarding its interests a~ainst a growing social 
a'vareness. The ~act that the na tional government has 
usually either been in the hands of the hacendado or 
attentive to his suggestion has enabled him to be assured 
low t a xes in li~e and the opportunity to incorporate his 
property to avoid inheritance taxes in death. Thus the 
two ~orces that have tended to break up large estates in 
Europe and North America are practically inoperative in 
Argentina . With the incorporation o~ the large estates it 
becomes possible ~or one o~ the legatees to sell his share 
without disturbing the permanence o~ the land holding. 
The · time o~ the ~all o~ Rosas was not merely the 
period in which immigrants arriving upon Argentine shores 
~ound that the pattern o~ land control was already well-
crystallized un~avorable ~or them. The middle o~ the 19th~ 
century was also the period in which the hacendado, having 
discovered the value o~ his land and cattle, ceased to let 
his cattle roam the plain the year round and began to ~enc 1 
his l~nds. With the Indians driven back there was 
increased security on the pampas. It became financially 
worthwhile to improve the breed o~ the scrub cattle, and 
the hacendados took new interest in their cattle which 
previously had been commercially important principally ~or 
their hides. A small number o~ Ar~entine cattle were 
shipped alive to the continent ~or consumption. Some bee~ 
were salted, but salted bee~ was never popular ~or foreign 
consumption. The later a~vent of the ~rigor{~ico made the 
breeding o~ quality meat v2 stly more important, yet the 
immediate post-Rosas period set the directio , of the 
n4 
interests o~ the hacendado ~or the years to come. 
From time to time a not altogether blind Argentina 
has sought to place some minimum regulations upon the 
country's oldest, most power~l industry -- cattle raising 
53. Weil, ~· cit., PP • 89-97. 
54. Haring, Clarence a., "Argentina and the United States , 
America Looks Ahead #5 , World Peace Foundation, Boston, 
1941, P• 34. 
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The marginal lire or the colono has caused a law to be 
passed providing ror some contractual relation between the 
tenant and his master. The ract that upon the latest 
government survey it was round that more than nO% or those 
employed on large estates have no contracts is considerable 
evidence that the hacendado is a class and law in a sense 
apart rrom the rest or the nation. The authorities, upon 
discovering that contracts had not been made, did nothing 
more tlmn express mild indignation, an interesting 
"l5 
illustration or the limitation or their actual power. 
The separatism and ethnocentrism or the hacendado as 
compared with his rellmv- citizens is attested by a variety 
or evidence. One or the most striking evidences is that 
this elite economi c group, because or its ties with 
continental--particularly British--capital and markets, 
does not have the nationalist interests more widely shared 
by the rest or the population. About RO% or the roreign 
investment in Argentina is British, and the rich hacendado 
families cooperate with these investo~consumers of 
Argentine beef and look kindly on British investment which 
assists in its production. Although many Argentines think 
the British merely i mperialistic exploiters, the hacendados 
grace the Boards or Directors or the British owned railways 
public utilities, and other interests. While they may not 
fi5. Weil, loc. cit. 
bear the British any love, their position is similar to the 
maharajahs or India, who having received ravors at the han 
or the British sovereign and being dependent upon British 
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monies cannot be openly artagonistic. The industrial 
preeminence or the British Empire in Argentina has been 
well recognized; Britain has been able to consider Argenti , 
virtually another colony because or the rapprochement or 
n7 
British capital with the powerrul hacendado. 
The lack or interest or the hacendado in national 
welrare, ir that were not coincident with the economic 
welrare or his group , has caused the hacendado historical! 
to oppose colonization. If the immigrant came in numbers 
he might compete with the hacendado for the land; if he 
settled in the cities instead he would be a factor in 
building a competitive industrial economy. That the 
hacendado has been able to discourage indirectly through 
political and economic activity the influx and settlement 
of immigrants again illustrates his group consciousness an 
58 
his group power. 
Socially the hacendado is as select as he is 
economically and politically omnipotent. When living upon 
his quasi-isolated estate in the manor-house at the center 
of his vast holding, the hacendado may fraternize with the 
. 6. Weil, 2.£• cit., PP• 130-1:12. 
57. The ~pectator , vol. 1591, 1937, p. 14. 
58. Dickmann, ~· cit., pp. 163-164. Cf . Burgin, ~· cit., 
PP • 32-:13. 
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Englishman, Irish, Basque, or Scot, whose education, good 
taste, and userulness makes him a n invaluable rn~~r-domo. 
This he will not do when at the capiro l where the society 
or his social equals is available. 
The paternalistic a ttitudes of the hacenti.ado toward 
the colonos on his lands a e seldom resented. The peon 
knows his place a nd values serving his master. That this 
medieval attitude still exists in force is evidence that 
the gap between the master and servant is so wide that the 
latter h s no o pportunities to learn how to improve himselr 
n9 
and therefore never learns the desire to do so. 
Lire ~ t the isolated mano:r-house is rel tively dull, 
however, a nd having reaped from the l a nd enough wealth to 
ma ke himself independent of it, the hacenda do spends much 
of his time in Buenos Aires or abroad. Their f ine homes in 
the capitOl a re practically a trademark of the group, as 
are their villas on the Riviera vhere they rival Indian 
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princes a nd American magnates in their prodigal spending . 
Such is the lire or the idle rich--and most of the 
hacendados were idle much or the time. Until quite 
recently, by the social ratings Argentines inherited rrom 
medieval Spain business occupations were considered to be 
work rit for Moors, Jews, negroes, Indians, mul a ttos, or 
mestizos, a n d di s tin ctly beneaththe d ignity o:f gentlemen 
59. Greenup,-2]. cit., pp. l:lo-132. 
60. Macdonald, 2.£· ~., p . 18. 
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were rnana~e more 
capably by their imported mayor-d~~o~ than they could have 
handled them themselves, politics and travel and scholar-
ship--o~ten mere dilletantisnr-remained their typical 
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occupations. 
There is yet to consider in a later place that 
organization which embodies the typical genius o:r the 
hacendado and through which it is displayed socially, 
economically, and politically . The Sociedad Rural 
Argentina is the apotheosis of' hacendado culture; it is at 
once an association of' livestock owners, an organization 
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socially impeccable, and a powerf'ul political f'orce. 
The highlight of' the annual program of' the Sociedad 
Rural Argentina is the Palermo Exposition . Bef'ore a mink-
coated, Paris and London garbed throng including the 
president of' the republic, the cabinet, and the diplomatic 
corps, the equally well-f'ed, well-groomed Argentine bull o 
the year is paraded to the roar of a thunderous ovation. 
The occasion is marked by a presidential speech on the 
quality of' Argentine beef nd the m"rket it currently 
enjoys. This is a matter of national significance; while 
70% uf Lite beef' production is consumed at home, the ~0~ 
exported amounts to 60~ of the nation's exports. As long 
nl. Garc1a~~an Agustin, Ciencias sociales, Buenos Aires, 
1936, P• 267. 
62. Bern!rdez, Hanuel, The Argenti11e Es tan_c_i_!!, Buenos 
Aires, 1903, pp. 6-~4. 
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as the nation continues to consider the breeding of 
magnificent bulls of prime importance, the security of 
the hacendado as the richest, most honored, best educated, 
most travelled national group is assured . It is not 
unnatural that they should fight for the c ontinuance of 
their privileged position by using their class power to 
dominate the economy, run the government, keep their 
63 
taxes low and their enemies powerless. 
63. Greenup,~· cit., pp. 126-128. 
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The Pattern o~ Argentine Railways 
IV. The New Era : 1877-1900. The cause and meaning of' 
change, the managerial revolution or the 
44 
latif'undio. The protectionism or the hacendado. 
Until the middle of' the eighth decade of the 19th 
century the market for the vast herd of' beef the hacendado 
had grazing upon his property was distinctly limited. 'er 
few cattle were sent alive to the hungry markets of the 
continent. Sanitary problems were too great; too often a 
shipment would not be admitted at the port of destination. 
Such business was not only uncertain; it was uneconomical. 
There was some foreign market for jerked beef, but this 
was not large. 
The largest demand f'or beef' received by the Ar gentine 
producers was th t of the city of Huenos .Aires. This, 
hmvever, was of little value to an hacendad.£ whose lands 
were some leagues beyond the bounds of' Buenos Aires 
province. For him the problem of keeping the m0at in good 
condition until it reached the uenos Aires mDrket was as 
severe as the problem of the latifundista in the province 
of Buenos Aires who loo J<"ed lonr.;inp:ly at the profitable, bu 
unattainable European market . That foreign markets were 
not attainable in any considerable size meant that domesti 
beef' was plentiful. Because it was plentiful it was cheap, 
and because it was chea p the profit to the hacendado was 
small. 
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Because the pro~it on raising bee~ was small, most 0~ 
the hacendados were more concerned with the hides than 
with the meat their cattle produced. Thus, until the New 
Era, longhorn scrub cattle which could live happily on the 
long, dry grasses o~ the pampas and which, while skinny, 
had thick, tough hides, were allowed to roam ~reely by the 
hacendados whose main concern was that they should 
annually be rounded up, the best hides taken, a ~ew steaks 
cut o~~ ~or immediate consumption, and the carcasses le~t 
to rot, incidentally enriching the pampas . 
In 1877 a French company which had been experimenting 
with the process o~ re~rigeration by using ether sent a 
I 
ship out~itted with its equipment to the port of Buenos 
Aires . In the first attempt to transport frozen bee~ 
across the ocean, "Frigorifique" carried the cargo from 
Argentina to France in 104 days. Upon arrival not all the 
meat was in excellent condition, but there was enough 
encouraging evidence so that toward the end o~ the same 
year another French steamer, the "Paraguay", was sent to 
Buenos Aires for cargo. The nrutton which it carried to Le 
Havre early in lA88 arrived in excellent condition and was 
quickly sold. In the four months necessary ~or the voyage 
it had not deteriorated; the French were enthusiastic and 
sought to expand the project, but were unable to raise 
su~~icient capital. The project was not abandoned, howeve , 
for it had attracted very favorable notice among both 
English and Argen tines, who by the end of the century 
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constructed four frigorfficos. Meanwhile, in the ten 
years following 1877, 57 refrigerator ships sailed from 
Buenos Aires, and by the end of the century 278 ships were 
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making the trip. 
From a contemporary document we learn that while only 
2,862 tons of frozen meat were shipped from Argentina in 
1885, within five years the volume increased tenfold. I n 
1886 frozen meat export increased to 7,350 tons. The rapid 
rise fell almost 2, 000 tons to 16,532 tons in 1.889, a year 
of unsettled economic conditions throughout the world, but 
in 1890 it jumped to 20 ,414 tons. This f.bulous expansion 
of the market for beef brought an entirely new emphasis to 
the cnttle-raising of' the 1.. tit'upftista; the value of' hides 
yielded to the value of' beef'. A new and unprecedented 
wealth fell to the hacendado a l ready rich from the 
66 
valorization of' his large l a nd holdings. 
64. "Cattle aising in 1 rgentina," ureau of l•'oreign and 
Domestic vommerce, '1epartment of' ~.~ommerce, \ ashington, 
1929, PP• 8-9. 
~he f'rigor{f'icos, successors to the saladeros, were in 
their early stages of development likewise crude~y modern 
standards. hey consisted of sheds for butchering and of 
large refriger~ted rooms for the freezin g , chilling , and 
storing of the meat. 
65. Rennie, ~· cit., p. 146. 
6fl. 'l'he _!p~hlJ: ~~uJ~l.e_!.in !!:! _!,he Bure.!lu of the American 
Repub'II'Cs, Vol. III, no. 1, Washington, T.Tulyl 189Fi, p. 7. 
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With the shirt or value or cattle rrom hides to beer, 
many new factors needed to be considered. Scientific 
breeding which would raise beef production mf'ant economic 
was required. The managing of the latifUp_~io was turned 
over to the mayor-domo, an imported specialist in the 
newly important problems, a technician in animal husbandry 
Thus the managerial revolution came to the latirundio. 
Certain of its moral and social overtones have been pre-
viously discussed; others and its political overtones will 
67 
be treated in Chapter 7 . 
I n the ' ew Era, the basic immigration policy or the 
modern Argentine republic was enacted. 1he immigration 
tha t was encouraged by the public and private monies eon-
trolled by the hacendado was an artificial inunigration. 
I t was not designed to attract those who wished to settle 
land, but rather to attract those who were already 
accustomed to a low level of' life and who would therefore 
68 
readily compete with cheap native, mestizo labor. Those 
European immigrants who came to Ar gentina were not 
expected to be independent producers of national wealth; 
they were to be merely cheap 3nd abundant labor f'or the 
governing landowners. 
67 . Rennie, 2E· cit., pp. 146-150. 
68. Dickmann, ~· cit., pp. 163-164. 
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Incontrovertible evidence of this ~act lies in the 
pass~ge in the same year o s the law o~ immi ration o~ a 
law ror the disposition of public lands. This law en-
ccuraged the sale or land in tracts of 200 , 000 acres to 
each individual purchaser. The importance o~ this act was 
enhanced by the fact that the provinces , in disposing or 
their public lands, ~ollowed the pattern set by the 
national law. Obviously latif'undios and s ponta neous 
immigration do not go together. The latifundistas, having 
the power , called the tune. In 1877, immigration exceeded 
emigration ~y 17,975 persons. For the year 18qo , 
immig ration exceeoed Pmigr~tion by ~0 ,~7~ persons . In the 
years 1877 to 1890 inclusive, the net immigration for the 
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Argentine republic was 9~3,776 persons . Some Argentine 
writers regard this immi"ration as sizeable, others regard 
it as small. The point or view seems to depend on the 
writer's social presuppositions. Demographically it is 
certain tha t ~ rgentina's immigration is far below what 
could have been profitable absorbed by the va st Argentine 
plains had the immigrants who would have developed them 
been encouraged to come. 
Long before the advent of' the frigor{~i_sQ and the 
railways and t h e beg inning o~ the ·ew Era, however, the 
hacendado had ~ound that his leagues or cheap land had 
valorized into a comf'ortable rortm1e. ith the realization 
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that he had only to hold them :for their value to increase 
and his wealth to grow, the hacendado developed a determi-
nation not to part with his lands . It was much the better 
policy, even though he could sell his land at a hannsome 
price, to hold it while it continued to ~ain in value and 
to settle peones and colonos upon it to work it :for him . 
The rents the hacendado was able to demand as the value o:f 
his land grew brought him a handsome living . In addition, 
since he was the only grocer and banker on his isolated 
estate, he :found that he :further pro:fited. Not only was 
the landlord the only supplier o:f his tenants, he was the 
only purchaser o:f their crops as well. As a result, the 
tenants :found that a large part o:f their work went, in 
actuality, :for permission to live and lvork on this land 
which primarily belonged to blooded cattle--land which they 
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might never hope to own :for themselves. Tt is not 
surprising, then, that 43 out o:f every 1 00 immigrants 
during this 1rew P:ra returned to the lands :from which they 
came, rather than remain in peasant vassalage to the rural 
overlords on land either badly cultivated or totally 
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abandoned to cattle . 
uoncentration o:f land does not increase agricultural 
production as centralization increases industrial productio • 
Dependence upon the vagaries o:f the seasons limits 
70 • Mart nezand Lewandowski , _£E. cit., pp. 168-169 • 
71. Justo,~·~., p. 143. 
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the possible division o~ labor in ~arming. It is not 
surprising there~ore that fi rgentine a~ricultural productio 
I 
has always been amazingly short o~ its potential . The 
tasks o~ the ~armer and o~ the rarm laborer's ~amily are 
close bonds to the land and make ~a.rming a more 
decentralized occupation. Landownership gives st?bility 
to rural li~e tha t is 1. eking to a social unit o~ tenant 
~armers whi ch tends to become a semi-nomadic existence. 
That the dominant hacendado did not ~ind it necessr ry to 
recognize these truths o~ na tional health by constructive 
a c tion rather than occasional palliatives is a discredit 
to his sense o~ noblesse obli~ and the source o~ his 
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present problems. 
~t is true that cause and effect are inextricably 
related and that the commercial concept o~ the ·ew Era had 
its utility despite its de~ects . Although the bulk o~ the 
bene~its were to the hacendados, the railways, inunigration 
~oreign capital, personal bank credit, mortgage credit, 
exports, and valorization were all bound up with the ~rowt 
o~ the nation. That the nation was in the hands of the 
hacenda~~~' either through their personal occupancy o~ 
positions o~ public power or through their influence as 
expressed by the Sociedad Bural ~r~tin~ or some other 
source, may well have been because with all their short-
comings they were still the group best able to bring order 
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out of the chaos that was Argentina ~rom 1810 to 1870 . 
72. I bid., pp. 147-lnO. 
e, ~· ~-·' P• ~~8. 
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The Sociedad Rural ~F~Et~p~ had rather humble 
beginnings in the year 1866. Although its founders were 
some of the most important hacendad~, the society was 
small a nd not particularly popular in its early years. 
From its start the society was devoted to the importation I 
an breeding of shorthorn ca ttle to replace the native I 
criollo cattle. As the available market for beef was quit l 
small in 1866, the majority of the hacendados had no 
interest in a cattle that had hide thinner than that of th 
criollo cattle. The railroad, the frigorffi~, and the 
refrigerator ships rapidly changed the economy of cattle-
raising in the ea.rly years of the New Era. By 1890 the 
Sociedad ~ET~l forgentiE2 had become a highly fashionable 
confraternity of cattlemen and the chief agency of their 
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power and policy. 
Although there is nothing in the constitution of the 
Sociedad Rural ~rgentina which restricts its membership to 
the large cattle raisers, its membership is comprised of 
the old, large land-owning families. The initiation fee 
is $250.00. The offices of this Rural Society and the 
addresses of 75% of its members are in the city of Buenos 
Aires. The organization concerns itself chiefly with the 
records of cattle breeding, with the business of showing 
cattle, and occasional lectures and discussions on the 
science of cattle raising to its city-dwelling farmer 
membership. 
74. Rennie, loc. cit. 
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he influence of the Rural Society is tremendous 
because the private influence or its members is tremendous 
and because it is outranked by no other organization in 
the nation, excepting the Roman Catholic Church. As the 
Society holds only one meeting annually, for the purpose 
of guiding the continuous official functions of the 
organization, control is vested in an executive committee 
with wide powers. The Rural Society 's officers and board 
members serve long terms; thus over a period of years the 
7!5 
control remains constant in the hands of a chosen few. 
In the last quarter of the 19th century the Argentine 
economy was totally under the control of the caudillo 
become landowner-capitalist whose chief industry was 
cattle-raising. While his was political control as ell 
as economic and social, his richness aggrandized the 
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nation. The keynote of the Nelv Era was mobility and 
refrigeration. With the rapid expansion of railroads 
between 1877 and 1890, lands in the north and south of the 
nation which had previously been inaccesMible were opened. 
These were distributed in large tracts which made even the 
sizeable latifundio of Buenos Aires province seem quite 
small. This land and the livestock it could support 
presented a new wealth, a. new frontier, to those who were 
75. Taylor, 2E· cit., PP• 393-400. 
7n. Ingenieros, ~· cit., p. 185. 
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wealthy enough to buy it in the large blocks by which it 
was sold. Grains and sugar had long been raised in the 
provinces o~ the northwest. Isolated in the hinterland, 
their market had never been great. With the extension of 
the railways a great impetus was given to these products , 
but they were never to challenge the dominant importance 
of the land for grazing. Meat and sugar, because they 
could be transported to market reasonably and in good 
condition, revolutionized the economy . Even grains grown 
incident to cattle-raising increased the new wealth . The 
transition made, the hacendado stood on the threshold of 
his Golden Age . 
v. The Golden Age: 189D-1916. The ~lowering o~ the 
hacendado. 
Between the beginning o~ the last decade o~ the 19th 
century and the years o~ the ~irst World War, there 
existed among men a sense o~ security which has since 
totally vanished. Today it is di~~icult to understand an 
era which had a sense o~ well-being, permanence, and 
inevitable progress as its basic presumptions. Yet i~ we 
be aware o~ the impress o~ the late Victorian and Edwardia 
periods, the pax Eritanica and the correlativ0 advance o~ 
science, we can glimpse i~ not know this strange time so 
shortly past. 
Despite variations resulting ~rom regional and nation 1 
peculiarities, certain elements o~ the climate of opinion 
o~ an age are world wide. To the Argentine hacendado the 
years ~rom 1890 to 1916 brought the ~lowering o~ his 
culture, and while his power and prestige were not 
permanently unseated in the latter year they were never 
again to regain the placid, unchallenged supremacy o~ 
their heyday. 
In the years preceeding 1890, the patriarchal lands 
o~ the hacendado were cleared o~ Indians so that he was 
~ree to make the most use o~ them. Modern technology 
developed in the years preceeding this golden age methods 
by which an almost unlimited market became available ~or 
the bee~ which throve so 
pampas. Thus berore the period we now consider the patter~ 
or the well-being or the hacendado had been determined; 
the golden age as a period not or search but or rruition. 
The abandonment or the estancias ror the more social 
lire or Buenos Aires and or Europe, leaving hired overseer 
in full charge, had other results in addition to creating 
a broad gap between the hacendados and their fellow 
countrymen. When away from their land, the hacendadoshad 
little reason to think of it except ror the money it 
supplied them. Thererore the hacendado lacked concern ror 
the proper planned development or his holdings; his prime 
consideration wa s that they be made to yield him as high a 
immediate profit as possible. Cattle raising was the most 
profitable of Argentine businesses; therefore other uses of 
the land were those coincident to cattle production ror the 
most part• The Argentine production of cereals, which 
came to be considerable, is accounted ror by the fact that 
they were grown on grazing lands being prepared for 
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reseeding with alfalfa for the pasture of fine stock. 
This national subordination of ~eneral agriculture to 
the primacy of stock breeding chiefly accounts for the 
social and economic gap between the Argentine tenant farmer 
and his counterpart in other nations. A natural result of 
the Ar~entine system is the employment of a colono who 
settles a section of the estate which h s become poor ror 
pasture. Under the direction of the mayor-domo, whose sole 
77. 
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interest is the improvement of the land for the use of the 
cattle, he plants four crops of wheat or some other grain 
which will help revitalize the soil. He pays approximate! 
30~ of his crop for rent of the land; what he gains from 
the balance permits him and his family to subsist in an 
adobe hut on the edge of his tillage. When he has harvest d 
his four crops, he seeds the area with alfalfa seed 1 
supplied by the hacendado. He must then move to make room I 
for the blooded cattle. His lease of land inevitably ends 
by his being dispossessed, and not until the alfalfa has 
run out will there be another tenant farmer to produce fou 
more crops of wheat upon that particular land. 
Thus there is little stable farm colonization in 
Argentina; restriction necessary to the economic welfare 
of the dominant group precludes, or at least do not en-
courage, the development of the independent farmer. Durin 
the years in which in other nations the gap between landed 
wealth and workers of the land was being abrid~ed by the 
breakup of feudal land holdings and a shift to an 
industrial economy, a converse tendency was apparent in 
Argentina. Instead of an increase in small holdin s it 
became apparent that the large ones were growing ever 
78 
larger. 
Capable Argentine economic reformers charge the 
absentee hacendado with a quasi-permanent impoverishment 
of Argentine lands because of excess commercialism. Many 
have sought large cattle crops with no sense o~ 
replenishment or ~he land by a break rrom pasture to 
grain crops. When replenishment by rotation has been 
ignored or selrishly postponed because or hope ~or yet a 
rew more herds of marketable cattle and the land has 
become exhausted, erosion has wasted large tracts of land. 
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This is particularly true in the lands toward the south. I 
Although trade and economies about the world were I 
relatively insecure in the early 1890s, in the early years 
or the decade Argentine export of frozen beef increased 
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some two thousand tons per year. At first thought this 
does not seem to be any great increase ror the hacendado. 
But while the quantity increase of chilled and rrozen bee 
export in these years is not amazing, the increase in 
export value is nstounding. In the single year 1914 to 
1915 the value per ton of chilled beef exported rose ~rom 
one hundred dollars gold to two hundred and ten dollars 
gold per ton. The total value of chilled beef exported 
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in 1915 totalled $38,000,000 gold. With this pattern of 
development it is easy to see why as early as 1908 the 
Sociedad Rural Argentina, certainly a most interested 
group, was able to cite with pride and satisfaction that 
they supplied one half of the meat imports for the United 
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Kingdom. 
79. Bunge, ~· cit., p. 339. 
80. Bulletin, Bureau of the American Republics, op. ~., 
p. 7. 
81. Bun 
Buenos Aires, 
82. / Sociedad Rural Argentina, Estad{stica gr,fica de la 
Republica Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1909, P• 30. -- --
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The golden age or the hacendado not only enhanced the 
economic position or the landowner, but his social positio~ 
as well. A national pride developed in the Argentine 
leadership in beer export and in the breeding or shorthorn 
cattle. Thus while the nation was sensitive or the ract 
that France dominated it culturally and that the United 
States was a superior power in the North , they rejoiced 
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that in livestock matter·s they were the world's leaders. 
It is not odd, thererore, that the hacendado was 
hailed by his countrymen as the individual who provided ror 
the economic regeneration or the nation based upon the 
immensity or its pastoral lands. The ravorable export 
balance created by shipment or meat to the continent 
provided the nation with purchasing power in industrial 
markets ror those commodities not available by domestic 
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manufacture. 
The inrlation in Argentina of the late 1880s and the 
collapse or the peso in 1890 widened the economic gap 
between the hacendado and the group which had begun to come 
to afrluence and prominence in the last quarter or the 
century. While the businessman's fortunes crashed with the 
peso, the hacendado lvho exchanq:ed his beer for the British 
pound sterling or the French rranc, was in a favorable 
position. He could either hold the stronger foreign 
currency or convert it at an ever increasing ratio to pesos 
83. 
84. 
Bern~rdez, ~· cit., p. 18. 
Bunge, IntercambiO, pp. 11-1~. 
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At the beginning or this golden period every rorce had 
seemed to contrive not only to protect the economic and 
social prominence the hacendado already enjoyed, but to 
augment it until he was not only in the dominant, but also 
85 
apparently unassailable position. 
Yet a doomed society, history teaches us, may be like 
a consumptive patient; a color or health may be apparent 
even when a mortal illness is present. The life cycle or 
ruling oligarchies shows, as in the example or Greece, 
Rome, Great Britain, that when the aristocracy seems most 
entrenched, most enjoying its position, elements or social 
rerorm are organizing to overthrow it at the same instant 
crystallization has robbed it or its vitality. In the last 
decade or the 19th century this was true in Argentina. 
Young intellectuals dreaming or democracy, most or them 
engaged in business or clerical proressions, began to plot 
the almost impossible task or overthrowing the long 
established hacendado dominance or Argentine political life 
The liberal intellectuals were representatives or the 
middle classes rather than or the proletariat, and they 
sought essentially honest government. They organized 
politically ror the achievement of their goal. Though they 
had not the power to wrest political control from the 
hacendado, who time and again took victory at the polls by 
rraud and violence, they were prepared to voice their ill 
Sn. Rennie, ~· ~., pp. 176ff. 
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when given their legal right to do so. The opportunity 
came with the election of 191A. 
Disturbed by the large group tl~t abstained from 
voting in national elections as protest of fraud at the 
/ N polls President Roque Saenz Pena, an enlightened member of 
the hacendado class, announced shortly after his assumptio 
of the presidency that in the next national election an 
honest vote by secret ballot would be made. The history o 
Argentine elections caused this announcement to be receive 
with some scepticism. / ~ 'hen illness forced Saenz Pena to 
turn his powers over to his vice-president most assumed 
that the pledge would be forgotten. To the credit of the 
Acting President de la Plaza, however, he observed the 
/ N T pledge made by President Saenz Pena. he result was 
amazing. The Radical Civic Union captured the presidency 
and the lower house of the congress. For the first time i 
the history of the nation menwere elected to the nation's 
highest offices who did not bear the endorsement of the 
first families. The hacendado was forced to face a new 
period, that of the liberal challenge. While many of his 
implements of power were still firmly in his possession, 
the hacendado was made aware that public sentiment was not 
universally in his favor. 
The liberal challenge was not made by the landless 
impoverished peon, nor did it use his latent power. It wa 
a challenge by the middle class. Hacendados, the educated 
61 
elite of the nation, should have been able to read from 
history the lesson that reaction against such a movement 
results in a more violent outburst. They did not. But 
from the clarity of hindsight it is unfair to condemn a 
group that did not misinterpret the social forces at lfork 
in Argentina by a degree more marked than the other I 
nations misinterpreted the forces lVhich lead them into one I 
world war, and later into a second. The estanciero faced 
in 1916 a liberal challenge, but it was for the most part 
a political challenge with correlative hopes on the part 
of the liberals for gradual social reform. As is so often 
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the ca se, the hopes remained just that. 
86. Macdonald, ..2.1! • .£:!-.!., pp. 93-97. 
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VI. The liberal challenge: 1916- 1930. The challenge 
or the oligarchy by the growing middle class. 
The leader or the liberal challenge to the established 
oligarchy or land owners, the new president or the republic, 
was Hip6lito Irigoyen, a man or great personal magnetism. 
He was the striking, popular leader ror a group seeking 
p olitical control as a first step in eradicating the great 
inequality, intellectually, physically, morally, socia lly, 
R7 
economically, between the oligarchy and the laboring man. 
The short term leases which doomed the colono to a semi-
nomadic lire, or which threatened him with it so that he 
was never tempted to improve his living conditions lest he 
be rorced to move on and leave the house he had labored to 
build, were early attacked. It is a measure or the genuine 
power or the hacendado, that even in this period or liberal 
control the only law enacted to improve the lot or the 
colono was the statutory provision that a lease should be 
ror the minimum or rour years. Upon later survey it was 
:round that this law lvas not generally observed, but the 
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authorities could do nothing but deplore the ract. 
87. Castro, Andres Maspero, La Cuesti6n Social, Buenos 
Aires, 1919, p. 100. 
88. Velardez, Julio G.~ "Land Settlement in the Argentine 
Republic", International Rev~ o:r Agricultural Economics, 
International Institute o~gricultural Bureau o:r Economic 
and Social Intelligence, M.s., vol. i, 1923, p. 24n. 
63 
Irigoyen personally was chiefly responsible for his 
country's strict neutrality during the World War. 
Although it was not at all times a popular course, it was 
an exceedingly profitable one. In the war years, during 
which the value or meat exports sJcyrocketed, 
of Argentina to buy from the continent built 
the inability ! 
up huge credi 
I 
reserves and served as well to encourage the establishment 
of light industry to provide some or the manufactured goods 
89 
presently in short supply. 
Elections throughout the period 1916-19~0 were 
generally honest; there was no reason for the liberals to 
try fraud, for they were conscious that public opinion was 
in their favor and that their mandate would be renewed. 
Following a common practice, as the Argentine constitution 
does not allow a president to succeed himself, Irigoyen 
selected Alvear to succeed him. When Irigoyen and Alvear 
broke during the latter's term or office, Melo was put 
forth as the government candidate, but the people preferre 
90 
Irigoyen and returned him to office in 1928. 
Irigoyen, never too capable at delegating power, 
concentrated the reigns or government almost completely 
within his own hands during his second term or office. A 
natural result was a creeping paralysis as the business of 
government was greater than he could attend to personally 
R9. Haring, op. cit., p. 1 • 
90. Macdonald, 2E• cit., p. 97. 
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and as none or his ministers or staff was permitted to act 
upon it independently. In normal times the results or 
such a policy might not have become apparent for some time 
Irigoyen did not race normal times; the crash or 1929 and 
the depression were immediately upon him. The government 
had to act quickly and his could not; in September or 1930, 
Irigoyen's government was quickly and quietly overthrown 
91 
by a group of hacendados aided by the army. 
The liberals had excellent intentions. They lacked 
political experience, however, and were unable to translate 
their intentions effectively into reality. They lacked 
also a sense o:f national duty which was the heritage o:f 
enlightened hacendados like S~enz Pefia. It lfas thererore 
to be expected that their control should be short lived. 
Its very existance, however, was a factual and empiric 
evidence of the truth of the prophesies and analyses of the 
liberal writers of the period concerning the ro:rces at work 
in Argentina. Increasingly it was recognized that new 
economic conditions were producing an industrial 
proletariat that would demand consideration in Argentina's 
economic ruture. In the evolving industrial proliteriat 
92 
was recognized a definite socialist threat: 
La constitucion de un proletariado--acentuada ya 
en los centros urbanos y en la econom{a industrial 
crear~ nuevos intereses de clase, cuya influencia 
sobre la futura pol{tica nacional ser~ cada vez mas 
considerable. 
91. Haring, loc. cit. 
92. 
o5 
La Repftblica Argentina marcha bacia el perldo de 
evolucion economica que precede a una direrenciacion 
neta de los partidos. La ausencia de grandes 
cuestiones historicas y pol{ticas es la mejor 
presuncion de que ellos podr~n ser rrancamente 
economicos. 
The agrarian reaction to the industrial revolution 
, 
along the R1o de la Plata as increased concentration of 
farm production. The latifundio, holding tenaciously to 
its ever grazing lands, separated the colono from the land 
he tilled. Unable to form rarming cooperatives because 
even when he had the purchase price good land was not 
available, the colono was rorced to rent. It is not odd 
that his interest did not coincide with that of the 
93 
landowner. 
Aware or the existence or such sentiment and or the 
fact that the nation's economy was crumbling under the 
crash of 1929, the hacendados felt the need of a firm and 
kindly hand at the helm or state. Armies were wont to ally 
themselves with conservative, wealthy interests that are 
willing to give them positions of importance in return for 
protection. The Argentine army has a typical record or 
such cooperation, and in the revolution of September ~, 
1930, furnished General Jose Uriburu, of old and 
aristocratic family, as leader of the forces against the 
constituted authorities. General Uriburu forced the 
resignation or Irigoyen and his government, sent the former 
president into exile, and declared himself provisional 
93. Ibid., P• 177. 
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president until a new government could be regularly 
established. With the legal president in exile and the 
congress disbanded, the supreme court recognized the 
94 
legality of the Uriburu government forthwith. 
An evaluation of the social reform of the Irigoyen 
period shows that attempts at social reform were made. 
Laws establishing retirement funds for employees, 
arbitration, Sunday rest, relatively free labor union 
activity, university reform, and housing projects were 
instituted. In general, however, the liberal movement 
failed in its purpose; this was due to both the leadershi 
and the rank of the movement. Irigoyen, while he sought 
not personal aggrandizement, embodied the old caudillo 
temperament and ruled his party and government with a 
dictatorial hand. This lost to him the liberals of out-
standing character who would not countenance such action. 
Also there were others in the liberal movement that were 
not as blamelessly motivated as Irigoyen. The rank of th~ 
party were generally incapable and intent upon gaining fo 
themselves as much spoils as possible. They filled most 
government appointments by nepotism with no regard to 
capability. The resulting scandals discredited the entir 
movement. It is not to be wondered then that some of the 
intellectuals have charge clrrigoyen with the f Bil ure o:f 
democracy in Argentina, for the attempt made during his 
94. Haring, £E• cit., pp. 12-13. 
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administration was not creditable. Even the respect ror 
the electoral laws, which had first permitted them to 
come to power, lvas not observed by the liberals after it 
9n 
became apparent that their opposition was mounting. 
Thus with general approval the hacendado returned to 
political power. But the rorces demanding the use or 
Argentina's sovereign power ror other interests had 
awakened. When the hacendado supremacy was a gain 
challenged, in 1943, it was a challenge or a dirrerent 
and more ominous sort. 
95. Rennie, ~· ~., PP• 206-224. 
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VII. Back to Normalcy: 193o-1943 . Political reaction; 
social reaction; economic reaction; paradox; 
basic economic and social change. 
At one time the islands o~ Mauritius, neuni6n, and 
~ Rodr1guez were densely populated with dodos. The dodo, 
however, unable to adapt himself' to an environment, which, 
I 
af'ter the advent of' European settlers, required some 
intelli~ence f'or survival, became extinct and thus an 
example f'or posterity. Social orssanisms, as well as 11 
His torr physiological ones, must adapt or become extinct. 
teaches us (despite the maxim that we learn f'rom history 
that we learn nothing f'rom history) that no status guo 
desired by benef'iciaries of' a given system ca n be 
indef'initely maintained; change is a universal law . Withll 
its seizure of' power in 1930, the conservative Argentine 
oligarchy sou!!;ht to turn back the f'low of' time to a perioji 
more agreeable . At f'irst it apparently succeeded in its 
ef'f'ort, but it was a deceptive, surf' ce succe ns. New 
f'orces were awakening in Argentina as truly as they were 
elsewhere in the world; in the brief' space of' thirteen 
years the hacendado f'ound, as men like him had been dis-
covering f'or centuries, that his victory was not ?S f'inal 
as it had appeared . 
Conscious of' the popular support received by the 
liberals , the hacendados lost no time af'ter their return 
to power in disseminating propaganrl a f'or their cause. 
I 
I I• 
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For the most part it was ineffectual. When they insisted 
that in Argentina all could be wealthy and that those who 
were not were only those unwilling to work and e rn wealth, 
Q6 
the descamisados listened but were unconvinced. I t was 
too a pparent tha t the wealth of the n~cendados came not fro 
work but merely from the fabulous increase of land and 
cattle values. The conservatives soon saw that it would 
take mo re than their propaganda to secure their position ; 
97 
therefore they a cted u pon the basis of that observa tion. 
General Uriburu, leader or the conservative 1930 
revolution, was determined to stamp out Ar gentine liberalis • 
To effect the rout of liberalism in the political sphere he 
made a practice or either declaring liberal candidates un-
qualified ror the positions for which they had been 
nominated or declaring election s void in which the li~erals 
triumphed. The presidents which followed Uriburu, Justo , 
Ortiz, and Castillo, were linked with ultra-conservative 
Senates which kept any liberal element that was hardy 
enough to survive the election frauds from greatly 
influencing national policies. I t was a technique or 
p c litical reaction to which .A rgentina had long been 
98 
accustomed. 
96. A term meaning literally "shirtless one", or 
colloquially "ragamuffin", which is applied to the 
Argentine underprivileged. Per6n has made political 
capital of this nickname . 
97. G'lvez , ~· cit., p. 99. 
98. r~~acdonald, op. cit., pp . 1 ,0-103. 
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bile the hacendado reaction was directed toward the 
liberals, it ignored the descamisados. It was a matter o~ 
habit. " The peon had passed centuries in his feudal estate 
and had not shown resentment of the gap between his lot an 
that of the hacendado. o the contrary he had shown great 
pride in the blooded cattle o.r his master and for which he 
had been disinherited. Descended from the gaucho , he had 
never been used to much . He did not need much in the way 
of a home, for he spent most of his nights wrapped in his 
poncho out on the broad, fertile pampas under the stars 
where he herded the cattle in all sorts of weather. He di 
not need schools, for useful knmvledge was limited to 
knoving how to ride a horse and how to use a knife. Such 
vas his life, and as for his right to vote, the landotner 
/ 
to whom the vote of the peon meant something, as it did no 
to the pe6n himself, told him how to vote and gave him som 
wine to the bargain. In light of this it is not odd that 
the hacendado did not consider the men who cared for his 
cattle and tilled his fields as a political force, but it 
was tragic to his interests that he did not. The was the 
man who was destined to be the tool of his political 
99 
downfall. 
In the years of their return to power the conservativ 
did two things: they corrected their mistake by which the 
liberals had come to powe~- honest elections; they 
99. Greenup, op. cit., pp. 131-13 • 
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reciprocated the loyalty and a~~ection to their interests 
o~ the Roman Catholic est .blished church which ever had 
turned its in~luence to their bene~it. The hacendados, 
unable to secure control o~ the government during the 
liberal years by honest means, had had to seize the 
sovereign power. Only the embarrassment o~ the depression 
to Irigoyen's government which was ossi~ied beyond con-
structive action gave them the excuse; they care~ully 
avoided the possibility o~ ~ree elections returning the 
100 
liberals to power. 
The social reaction o~ the new government was 
apparent in the ~act o~ increase in si~e o~ the large 
landed properties. Still more land came to be owned by 
~ewer people than ever be~ore• As a result the l a tifundio 
""lo1 1 
and particularly the deceptive latifundio ~ci~l, came 
under severe criticism in these years . The moral right o~ 
one segment o~ the society to hold ~or its own advantage 
the best o~ the national wealth, which had never been 
seriously questioned since colonial times, was no longer 
a ~oregone conclusion. Increasingly it was ~elt that high 
taxes should be placed upon the large land holdings, 
~ollowing the continental and Nortlr-American pattern, as 
a method o~ ~orcing their sale and conversion to smaller 
tracts. It was ~elt that such a move on the part o~ the 
100. Weil , 2.1!• cit., PP• 9, 41. 
101. Supra, PP• 32-34. 
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government would encourage immediately considerable 
i mmigration, increase Ar gentina's potential assets, and 
strengthen the well-being or the nation. 
Had this desired pro gram o:r dismembering the 
latirundios into smaller rarms been carried out, however, 
it would not have achieved the desired end. Land prices 
made land available only to the wealthy. Ir a rarmer had 
been able to borrow the requisite amount to purchase such 
a rarm at the standard 5% interest, he would have had to 
be able to sell at export prices at least 40% of his pro-
duction and to produce in quantity in order to meet his 
payments. The mechanical aids ror large scale production 
would be beyond the reach or the small rarmer, and the 
export or 40% or his produce was impossible in a nation 
102 
where the privilege was firmly held by the estancieros. 
The landed gentry were not insensitive to the critici m 
or their rea.ctionary social tendencies; they even compre-
hended some oT the elements of their unenviabl e position. 
A conservative interest in mild social re:f'orm developed. 
For some forty years laws had been proposed in Congress at 
the rate or about two a year in an ef:f'ort to mitigate the 
worst evils or the lati:rundios, rive presidents o:r the 
republic having been more or less interested in such actio • 
But it was not until 1940 that a land law :favoring the 
102. Bun.'ge, Una Nueva Argen.t.i_D!:_, pp. 34o- 3.!')0. Greenup, 
.£!!. cit. , p. 129. 
73 
development of small farms passed the national legislature. 
In that year a rational Agrarian Council was created ~or I 
the purpose of using public lands to aid those who wished 
to develop small, independent farms. But even this gestur 
was half-hearted. Over a year passed before the first 
appointee to the board was named, and even then no appro-
priations for its operation were authorized by the Congres • 
Like the colonization legislation of 1917, the law of' 1940 
providing for use of public lands for the benefit of the 
small farm owner-operator, rather than for the hacendado 
whose domain they had ever been, was more an admission of 
what should occur for the nation's general welfare, rather 
than a declaration of intended action. Perhaps it is just 
as well, for the law did not provide for the solution of 
the problem at the basic point of difficulty. It made no 
provision for the breaking up of the great estates, and all 
the land really desirable for occupancy by farmers of' 
limited means were already occupied by tne sprawling 
latifundios. Farmers of limited means must have easy 
access to markets of importance if they are to profitably 
dispose of' their production. They could not afford heavy 
freight or trucking costs and compete with large scale 
producers. Even less could they afford the re ote 
isolation of the government lands not previously taken. 
The law of 1940 was severely criticiZed by the liberals 
because it was not forceful enough; it did not .get to the 
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root o~ the problem. The law o~ 1940 was equally con-
demned by the conservatives who declared that such 
g overnment meddling with the nature o~ things was 
unnecessary in bountiful .11 rgentina, which provided ~ood, 
clothes, and housing enough ~or all. This sound and ~ury 
raged over a law which signi~ied nothing. The lalf was 
hal~-hearted in its inception, completely lacking impli-
mentation, and unable to bene~it even the small :farmer :Lor 
whom it was designed i~ both its letter and spirit were 
:ful~illed. Such were the ~ruits o~ the social legislation 
passed in the enlightened sel~-interest o~ social 
103 
reactionaries. 
The return o~ the hacendado to power, inevitably 
meant that certain presumptions concerning Argentina 's 
economic development would return to vogue with him. TTnde 
his aegis ~arm labor costs were kept to a ninimum that 
Argentine meat and ~arm products might have pre~erential 
entry into world markets. ~ aintenance o:r minimum wages on 
the estancia_s was coupled with a policy of limited domesti 
industrial production. This latter 1llan meant that bee~ 
consumers might have the reciprocity o~ industrial export 
to .Argentina. The system supposed a low purchasing power 
~or the vorl{ers that the hacendado might be enabled to 
104 
enjoy the luxuries. 
103. 1IacDonald, .££• cit., pp. :-l43-344. 
104. Greenup, £E• cit., pp . 133-134. 
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In years or growing social consciousness it became 
increasingly dirricult, however, to pretend this economy 
was optimum ror the nation. That it benerited the Pritish 
investor-consumer and the Ar gentine hacendado was more 
obvious. et even the economy or the hacendado surrered a 
severe blow when, after the ottawa Conrerence or 19~2, the 
economic application or the Empire's inter~ doctrine was 
10. 
announced in a series or rigid bilateral trade agreements. 
1iore than ever the hacendado turned against domestic II 
industrial p roductiol1, ror nmv more clearly than ever each 
article produced at home meant less Argentine beer consume 
abroad. The Roca-Runciman Treaty, which went into errect 
in 1933, provided the restricted basis ror British-
10 6 
Argentine trade. Although the hacenE.ado cared little t 
11 
re l inquish traditional multilateral trade , it was a con-
I 7 
cession prererable to the loss of the ~ritish trade entirely. 
105. The British inter~ doctrine developed concurrently 
with the legal theory or independent, selr-governing 
dominions and has been recognized as valid by internationa 
courts. It provides ror a special relationship between th 1 
dominions and the mother country, so that, as ampliried by 
the Ottawa conrerence, the rormer are not subject to the 
g e neral ritish external trade agreements. Tnus .anadian, 
Austra lian, and :rew Zealand beef and mutton received a 
favored position. 
106 . The P.oca-nunciman bilateral treaty was forced upon 
the Argentine by the threat or the British to turn their 
entire market in farm products to the dominions. ThP 
Argentine was given a quota aimed to balance their export 
to Britain with their import of ritain's manufacturing. 
107. Weil, op. cit., p. 146. Rennie, £E· cit., PP • 2~4-2 1 7. 
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Yet the reactionary attitude o~ the conservatives in 
economic spheres cont~ined elements o~ paradox. The 
I hacendado~ began to ~ear a development which tended greatl~1 
to preserve the lati~pp~io, and even to increase it ~rthe 
With the incorporation o:f a lati~undio, it becaiile 
i~ an heir wished the money value o~ his share o~ 
possible, 
an estate! 
merely to sell his stock rather than break up the estate 
that he might withdraw his share. As a result many 
lati:fundio corpora tions have ceased to be simply ~amily 
a~:fairs, and have instead come under the control o~ new, 
non-land ealth. In this lies a threat recogni zed by the 
hacendad£• While the landowner personally lived on his 
estates he could gather together his peones and herd t h em 
to the polls, instructed to vote ~or the hacendado 
candidate. Even when he had sailed ~or Europe and the more 
tempting pleasures o~ continental li~e the mayor-domo who 
was le~t in charge and supervised the a~~airs o~ t h e 
estan_cia was able to do this political corralling ~or him. 
But lati:fundio corporations which passed ~rom hacendado 
hands were likely to be bought control o~ by i ndustrial 
interests. Thus the vote o:f the peones on such lands ould 
be led to candidates ~avoring industry and to legislation 
detrimental to the established interests o~ the hacendado. 
Suddenly, paradoxically, the reactionary attitudes o~ the 
hacendado were tempered by their desire to limit the 
in~luence o~ new industrial interests now expressing the~ 
108 
selves throu h indire 
108. Weil, ~· ~., PP• 95-103. 
I 
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~conomic ~orce is o~ten more in~luential tlmn 
ideological :force . In the liberal years o~ and ~ollowing 
orld ~ar I many important boolcs and articles were written 
raising the question o~ moral right o:f the hereditary land-
owning group to the bounties o~ the ,Pampas :for their near-
personal use. r he total in:fluence o:f these documents was 
less important in the struggle against the hacendado than 
economic changes hich were taking place during this same 
period. 
What had been simple shops be~ore 1914 became during 
the war genuine :fp ctories in order that industrial consumer 
materials might be produced :for the home market which was 
deprived o~ its traditional European sources . Although 
domestic production lagged ~or a bit :following the end o:f 
the war and the ~establishment o:f international trade, the 
decrease o:f world trade resulting :from the world depression 
again strengthened these plants in supplying manu~actured 
goods ~or the home market . rorld ar II breaking out in 
1939, :further stimulated industrial development. The 
unprecedented demand ~or manu:factured goods brought swi:ft 
expansion spurred by sure pro~its. r ow :for the ~irst time 
in Argentine history the industrial production exceeded in 
value the combined value o~ livestock and ~arm products . 
Despite conservative political control , the Argentine 
economy had progressed through a slow but sure revolution. 
As had occurred elsewhere in the world, the attempt to 
78 
return to an earlier period of' normalcy failed; while by 
fraud and violence old political forms might be revived 
t hey no longer mirrored reality and therefore were doomed I 
to collapse. Just before the end of this strange interlud 
the Pinedo plan was purposed as an attempt to harmonize 
109 
the interests of the hacendado and the industrialist. 
These were not mutually consistent, and the pl an met much 
opposition causing .Pinedo's resignation. I t might have I 
been possible for the hacendados and industrialists to use 
the Pinedo plan as an armed truce if it had not received 
severe criticism from a third interest for whom it did not 
110 
provide--the Argentine worker. 
I llustrative of the rapid industrialization in late 
depression and early World 1 ar II years is the f a ct that 
between 1935 and 1943 the increa se in industrial work was 
200~ of the increase during the years 1914 to 193~. 'Phis 
meant, when cow!Jared 'ith the position of the hacendado, 
more than a simple increase of potential in the ranks of 
the industrialists. The workers for urban factories were 
drawn chiefly from Argentine rural areas; thereby the 
competitive position of the hacendado was further weakened 
I 09. An interesting critique of the Pinedo Plan is found 
in t, Gonzales Al berdi, 1Jaulino, ••..!::.! Si tuaci6n econ6mica del 
p_a1s; el plan .t'inedo ,~~ E-~ la olig ... r:qu1a," .uuenos Aires 
1941. 
The Pinedo plan ingeniously combined (1) crop 
financing, (2) encouragement of e xports, (3) nationalizati 
of foreign investments, (4) low-cost housing program, 
(5) long-range industrial finance, (6) encouragement of 
industrial development. The plan was fiercely att eked as 
a move by the ha cendados t oward rapprochement with the 
. . . by ctw:o 1 f:absoera0 tf'imona 1•· nta i:ilna3:"'1'ng=t-be-1:r~=trl~'f"f"·=====#====== privileged position 
110. Greenup, loc. cit. ,,.e1·1 op c1·t 1 , --· ___ ., p. ~4f'f. 
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as the abundance of cheap labor available to him dwindled. 
Other factors intimately bound up with the growth of 
industrialism were correlative problems for the hacend do. 
While foreign immigration had never been large compared 
with that to the United States or compared with Argenti1m's 
need for and potential absorption of them, the steady 
trickle over the years amounted in aggregate total to a 
sizeable influx of comparatively liberal European opinion. 
The bulk of' the immigrants, not finding opportunity 
beckoning from the pampas where they were needed, settled 
in the cities where they were early a r~ ctor i n public 
opinion. / bile the gaucho, ~eon, and colono needed no 
school, the same could not be said for the industrial 
worker who must be able to follow instructions of some 
complexity in the operation of machinery and the performanc 
of skilled jobs. Education invariably results in a desire 
for better living and a voice in the control of' one's own 
destiny and of public affairs. 
In the cities labor unions came into being and 
gathered force as they had in other industrial natiovs, 
while on the estancia, where the labor organizers would 
have been shot as trespassers, the movement had no chance 
to show what it could accomplish. The lcbor organizer 
could not in the lands of the ~arnpas expect his legal 
rights as an individual to be protected by the police whose 
111. ~.~, P• 73. 
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supplemental income ~rom the local hacendado made the 
police compliant to his wishes. The development o~ 
workers' groups in the urban areas brought a power~l new 
political ~orce into existence, a pro-industrial, anti-
agrarian workers' organization. These correlatives to 
industrialization were by no means unique to Argentina; 
most nations had experienced similar development at 
112 
comparative stages. 
1Vith all these ~actors at work the status ~uo o~ the 
hacendado could not be inde~initely maintained. At a tim~ 
when courage and initiative were present these ~orces 
would combine with existing national conditions to bring 
in a new era. I n the ~all o~ the hacendado in 1943 that 
occurred. I~ it had not happened in 1943, it would have 
happened eventually anyway. The natural change in social 
~orces within the nation meant that the existing system 
did not represent reality. Such a situation cannot exist 
inde~initely. 
112. Ibid., P• 72. 
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VIII. Surrender to Industrialism: 194~ . 
abdication o:f the oligarchy. 
he :forced 
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With the overthrow o:f the hacendado government in 
1943 by the military, a revolution was initiated which 
did not :formally drop its disguise and appear in its 
true :form until 1946 when Per6'n, casting aside all 
deception, assumed the presidency. In the early months 
o:f the revolution inconclusive reports available to 
orth-Americans led to immense speculP.tion as to the 
signi~icance of the fall o:f the h8cendado regime. 
n ecause o:f the still undecided outcome o:f the F.uropean 
war, the democracies were vitally concerned with the 
establishment of a government in Argentina :friendly to 
their cause. The successive governments o:f military 
juntas ~ave them little encouragement, :for the cabinets 
included pro-Axis members as often as they did members 
:favoring the democracies. To most :foreign observers the 
Argentine military governments were deceptive. As they 
were traditional in times of Argentine national crisis, 
it wa s not at :first observed that behind this normal 
:facade genuine and :far reaching changes were taking 
place• The government o:f the hacendados was abdicating 
to the government o:f the industrialists. 
Perhaps government o:f the industrialists is not 
completely accurate, government o:f the industrial 
--
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economy would be more precise . It is, however, the I 
industrialists who have the bulk of the power, if not the 
bulk of the publicity, in the emergent era of the 
descamisado. Argentina, in the years 1943 and after, 
arrived at the knovledge so long shared by her maturer 
sister nations that under the guise of improving mass 
conditions a strong leader's pockets may be lined by 
cooperative capital. The caudillo personality remains at 
/ 
a premium in the B!£ de la Plata. 
In 1942 the eminent statesman, Ruiz-Guinazti, 
declared: 
El ttnico remedio contra la convulsion X la 
dinamita es la justicia expresada EQ ~ palabras, 
sino por la aplicac~6n integral de una legislacion 
~tiva. En un pais nuevo, inmensamente grande 
ico, la miseria no tiene raz6n de ser• El estado 
que la tolera, confiesa, a voces, su ineptitud 
congenita. 
It was a true and frank statement of the Argentine 
113 
problem. 
The forces behind the revolution of 194~ were not 
particularly liberal, certainly not in an enlightened 
sense. The revolution was ac companied by a general exodus 
from Argentina of many of the nation's great liberal 
intellects. It was, however, as others had not been, a 
popular revolution which had the support of the workers 
who felt assured that it would better their lot. This it 
did in the move toward a nationalism and quasi-fascism 
113. Ruiz-Guifiazu, Alejandro, La Argentina ante si misma, 
Buenos Aires, 1942, p. 178. ---- --
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which improved the lot of the descamisado by an 
authoritarian paternalism, a tlventieth century version o:f 
Argentine caudillismo. 
The worker whose life had so long been marginal was 
willing to sacrifice future democratic rights to present 
economic improvement. During the whole history o:f the 
nation he had heard the palliatives of democracy but had 
not received bread. When bread was handed to him be 
cared little that it was not accompanied with democratic 
assurances. 
The revolution of June 4, lqtf.~ was achieved by the 
combined forces of all political and military segments 
who did not approve of the continuation of the hacendado 
dominance. Thus dissimilar and antagonistic groups found 
themselves in close juxtaposition in the rapidly changing 
cabinets and governments of Generals Rawson and Ram{rez. 
Pro-allied, pro-nazi and pure nationalist interests 
jockeyed for control. 
The Argentine army bas always been essentially 
bourgeois in its outlook, and its dictatorship is in the 
last analysis equally against the economic regime o:f the 
landed oligarchy and that of the \fOrking class which they 
fear. Juan Domingo Per6n represents the clever leadershi 
o:f the nationalist cause. 
In the months immediately :following the revolution 
" the ends o:f Peron were not obvious. He was content to 
s. 
officer in them, even though the power of the faction of 
army officers he led entitled him to a position. When in 
.; 194d. Peron chose to head a new national Labor Department, 
the pattern of his appeal to the worker became obvious. 
Workers' pay was raised; land rents were reduced; food 
prices were pegged; tenure and pensions were guaranteed. 
The ultimate object of this plan, like that of Mussolini's 
corporate state, was the total control of the working class ! 
and their organization into a disciplined governmental 
hierarchy. 
The one group to be favored by the revolution was the 
industrialists who were a means to an end important to the 
nationalists. Even as the industrialists had been 
discriminated ae;ainst by the hacendado because of the 
latter's fear tha t domestic industry would steal British 
markets and therefore make them less willing to buy 
.Argentine beef, the na tionalists lool{ed to the development 
of industry to break British dominance of the Argentine 
economy. They courted the industrialists and the Roman 
Catholic church, seeking their assistance in the creation 
of a Catholic corporate state founded on Hispanic traditio 
It was three years before the revolution ·worked its way to 
its logical conclusion with Peron's formal assumption of 
114 
the presidency in 1946. 
114. Rennie, £E• cit•, p. ~39ff. 
IX. The impact or the hacendado on Argentine life: 
socially, economically, politically, and as 
a nationalist. 
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The hacendado is and is not a peculiarly Argentine 
phenomenon. In broader outline we find his counterpart in 
many nations at that point at which their history changes 
from feudalism to modern lire. Yet in many ways the 
hacendado is distinct; his caudillo colonial forebears, 
the vastness or his lands and their sparce population, the 
primacy or the cattle raising in the economy, his entry 
into commerce--all give him distinctive markings by which 
he may be differentiated from somewhat similar types of 
other nations. To a greater extent than it may be honestl 
said or other oligarchies, the hacendado was during the 
height of his power truly an Argentine type• His 
personality was the personality or the nation. 
The hacendado exerted the social, economic, and 
political force which was dominant in patterning Argentine 
development in e a ch of these spheres. Much or his pattern 
was unreasoned, much of it was determined by the happy 
accident or a bounteous nature which presented him boundle s 
opportunities from which, with a native intuition, he 
constructed his world. But time brings changes, changes 
that are not always welcome. There is a natural tendency 
to try to hold all that one has gained. Orten in so d oing 
one loses all. The hacendado laced himself in a 
R7 
position by not coming to terms with the changing times 
when the free elections of 1916 gave him warning. But eve 
the post-1943 Argentina, even the Catholic corporate state, ! 
will bear the impress of his culture, presumptions, and 
actions for many years to come. 
Social values, more than any others, are based upon 
tradition. The hacendado owed his social primacy to his 
heritage from colonial feudalism; land ownership was the 
source of prestige. A land owning oligarchy passed from 
one generation to the next the money and the leisure time 
with which to travel, learn. Thus the hacendado came to b 
a markedly distinct social class in a frontier nation. 
Buenos Aires might be provincial, but not the hacendado. 
He visited the continent regularly. He brought home 
fashion, learning, culture. As the best trained, he 
assumed many public functions and developed that most noble 
concept of a privileged class--a sense of responsibility to 
use in public service the fruits of life he has been per-
mitted to enjoy. While the result of such national 
development may be to direct the forces of a nation to one 
group, during the years in which such an oligarchy is 
vigorous and alone capable of handling national affairs it 
may make a genuine and constructive contribution to the 
nation's welfare. 
During this period of the flowering of the hacendado, 
the wealth of the land owning group increased so 
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the industrialists and professional man that his social 
position became well-nigh unassailable. Though the 
hacendado is now dethroned politically and no longer the 
largest factor in the Argentine economy, it will be many 
years before the slmvly evolving social mythos will be abl 
to firmly postulate another supreme social being in his 
place--and even then the hacendado will have a place among 
the ancient heros, who although remote still retain a 
fabled aura of magnificence. 
The economic power of the hacendado was well-nigh 
absolute and was the foundation of his other powers . In a 
feudal society land is wealth. By taking unto himself 
control of the Argentine wealth the ha cendado was the grea 
formative force of the Argentine nation. Unlike most 
feudal groups, the hacendado did not begin his decline wit 
the coming of commerce. The natural and chief export of 
Argentina grew painlessly upon the lands he controlled. 
Without effort and without change in the form of his 
holdings he was able to make the transition from being 
essentially a landowner to being essentially, though he 
still owned the same land, a cattle merchant. 
Yet again strange circumstance provided for the 
dominant economic survival of the hacenda.do. In the first 
transition from commerce to industry, the cattleman reaped 
the advantage . Mechanical improvements, railways and 
refrigeration, permitted him to ship his production to ever 
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increasing marlrets. A new and v st wealth was tapped :for 
him and he entered his golden age. Certainly this he woul 
attempt to prolong. He used his in:fluence to keep costs 
low and industry weak that competed with that o:r his buyers 
in order that his bonanza might continue. That the gradua 
evolution of other interes~s did not permit him to remain 
dominant does not mean that he no longer has power. A 
sizeable minority economic power rests still in his hands, 
and it will be many years be:fore much can be considered in 
the Argentine economy without planning the place o:r the 
bull and of the hacendados '\vhose ranches produce him. 
The political pmver o:r the hacendado rested, o:r cours , 
upon his economic primacy and his s ocial training and 
ability. From the :first, in Presidents, Avellaneda, Mitre, 
Sarmiento, and others, the hacendado contributed outstand-
ing leaders to the young republic. As the years lvent on 
men o:r outstanding ability and c l~racter were interspersed 
with men o:r lesser ability, but in general a thou ght:ful an 
capable group lead the nation to the best o:r their abiliti 
That the interests o:r the nation were identi:fied in their 
mind with interests particularly bene:ficial to themselves 
is no di:f:ferent :from the illusion held by any other 
economic-social-political oligarchy which has governed. I 
the span of history we :find the interests of nations are 
i nevitably identi:fied with the interests o:r the then 
dominant group within the political body. By present-day 
• 
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nationalist standards it is dirricult to comprehend the 
quasi- colonial psychology or the hacendado. His 
subservience to British capital seems the selling or the 
nation to roreign investors ror selrish purposes. But 
today's point or view in no way detracts rrom the truth 
that in the middle or the 19th century it as quite 
honestly apparent to the hacendado that the nation vould 
prorit ir he were supplied with railways and the other 
advantages British capital could orrer him in the pro-
duction and distribution or beer. 
Considering the eventual rall or the hacendado to a 
nationalist army-industrialist group, it is interesting to 
consider the role or the hacendado as it touches upon fu at 
secular deity or the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 
nationalism. 
Although in mid-nineteenth century the Federalists 
emerged triumphant on paper at the end or the civil wars, 
the 1R~3 constitution as amended opened the path to the 
rulrillment or Unitarian interests. The government in the 
hands or the wealth landowners resident in Buenos Aires 
soon began to take greater and greater control or internal 
matters or the provincial governments through intervention 
and subsidies. As industry and roreign trade continued to 
develop in the port city out or proportion to their 
increase in the interior, porte£io control was extended, 
until by the end or the first quarter or the t entieth 
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century f'ederalism remained nothing but a powerf'ul myth . 
During the years of' unif'ication, having made peace 
with Spain only a s late as 1863, Argentina consistantly 
ref'used to have any political identity with her sister 
nations of' Latin America and took only half'- hearted interes 
in Pan-American meetings excepting those in ihich she was 
116 
indisputably the leader. 
The ruling f'amilies whose names appear and reappear 
among the presidents and other political leaders of' the 
republic were tied to the continent and to Britain by stro 
f'inancial interests. The status quo which they maintained 
showed a certain politicc- 1 enlightenment typical of' the I 
period, which was inherited f'rom the culture of' Argentina' s l 
investors. V hil e the artisans, "orkers , and gauchos were 
yet voiceless, Buenos Aires grew into a cosmopolitan 
metropolis that imitated London and Paris. 
National f'eeling was more romantic and sentimental 
than political in nature; it was transcendental, of' and f'or 
the spirit. Otero, f'amous Argentine publicist, def'ines 
117 
rather extensively and with clarity this extant nationalism 
115. Rowe, E,l!• cit., chs. iv-vi. 
116. Pinero, ~orberto, La Pol{tica internacional argentina 
Buenos Aires, 1924, p. 81; 93-102. Gil, Enrique , Evoluci6n 
~ panamericanismo, uenos Aires, 1933, pp. 3Q-34, n4-;s, 
60-75. 
117. Otero , Jose Pac{f'ico, Nuestro nacionalismo, ensayo de 
~ valores hist6ricos X sociales, Buenos Aires, 19 o, 
PP• 17-18. 
Sin exponerme a un desmentido cate ~rico, yo 
puedo arirmar que hay una ideolog{a argentina que 
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rundamenta la razon de ser de nuestro na cionalismo. 
Esa ideolog{a no es solo pol{tica· Ella es moral, 
econ6mica, pol~tica, religiosa y literaria. Apoyados 
en la democra c1a, no hemos prodigado con generoside d 
a los extranos y solo hemos guardado para nosotros 
aquella parte de bienestar de l a cual ~o se puede 
prescindir si no queremos desra llecer en la vida. 
AOn m~s, en cada conciencia reconocemos una libertad 
y respetamos un culto. Las naciones son para nosotro 
entidades sagradas, y de estas dos palabras soberan1a 
y solidaridad, hemos constituido un binomio polftico, 
base del respeto con que se nos considera en nuestra I 
vida continental. No es posible, entonces, que todo 
~sto se desmorone y se precipite en el caos. 
Mi nacionalismo no e s estrecho ni ego{sta. El 
es ind{gena por un lado, pe ro humano y universal por 
el otro. Como no es ni retro~ra o ni rutinario, ama 
lo que es gr2dual; y en ver a la na ci6n soh erana 
independiente, senora exculsiva en la elaboraci6n de 
su destino, rinca sus votos y sus esperanzas. Como 
hijo ~ue es de la libertad, ama la individualidad, 
pues esta es rasgo de independencia y acicate para 
1 . / a acc1on. 
It was this liberal concept or nationalism which con-
tributed to and formed essentially Argentina's reaction to 
orld War I. As a neutral, rgentina did not have a seat I 
a t the ersailles Conference, and her participation in the 
118 
League of Nations was quite sporadic and rather purposeles • 
1fhile Argentine opposition to the United States' 
leadership in this hemisphere w· s never v oiced with the 
cla rity a nd brilliance equal to tha.t or Uruguay's Josl 
/ Enrique Rodo in his classic Ariel, it has been even more 
persistent. It is a dominant element of Argentine 
nationalism forged of haughty Spanish pride and pure 
118. Hudson, Manley o., "The Argentine 
League or Nations," America n Journal 
Republic and the 
or International Law, XA~III (1934), pp. 12~1~3. ~
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economics, as the North-American f'armer and cattleman is 
to some extent (and always to a far greater potential is) 
a competitor of' the hacendado. Yet the hacendado as a 
nationalist was liberal compared with the new nationalism 
of' the World Wa r II and af'ter. Indicative of the new , 
illiberal Argentine nationalism is the recent shit't of 
emphasis in the writings of' Argentine historians. For 
three generations national historians have agreed with 
objective foreign studies condemning Juan Manuel de ~osa s 
as a brutal tyrant and his dictatorship by force as the 
greatest degradation of the republic· The most recent 
publications of the national press exchange this view for 
one which now elevates Rosas to noble, Napoleonic heights 
t'or his subjection of' the nation to a single t'orce, for 
his strong hand in f'oreign af'fairs, and f'or his sedulous, 
extremist propagation o:f a nationalist spirit. Hip~lito 
Irigoyen, whom history has heretofore known as a mystic 
and fanatic, is likewise being elevated to the new pantheo 
of' national heroes• By comparison, the nationalism of the 
hacendado, if not pronounced because of' personal economic 
119 
interests, seems at l e ast health:ful. 
119. The background f'or this analysis was obtained by the 
author in conversation with various Latin American scholar 
and of'ficia ls when serving as interpreter f'or Latin 
American military missions visiting Fort Benning , Geo rgia, 
and later when employed in the Ot'fice of the Coordinator 
of' Inte:r-American Af'fairs, Washington , D• c. 
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x. Summary and Conclusions. 
The roots or the hacendado go back to colonial times. 
He is descended ~rom the adventurers who early came to the 
viceroyalty or La Plata to make their ~ortunes. The 
Spani,rds stayed in the new world and bred criollo heirs; 
the criollo developed the caudillo, the strong man or the 
Argentine plain who seized his lands rrom the Indian 
in~ested wilderness with energy and courage. Finally the 
caudillo evolved the hacendado, the t;entleman and absentee 
landlord, vhose culture rlowered in a lD ti~undio system 
upon the rich pampas . The wealth or his holdings gave the 
h~ cendado increased prestige and virtual control or the 
economy and politics or the nation. 
It is a truism that a favored segment or society is 
intent upon holding its ravors. It is certainly true o~ 
the hacendado. The temporary loss of political power to 
the liberals rollowing World War I did not bring the con-
servatives to a vigorous renaissance; it merely caused them 
to be firmly reactionary when they a~in seized political 
power. Yet permanence is not an achievement of man; the 
:f'lm of' history cannot be heir back. Basic changes, slow-
working but nonetheless real, had trans:formed the basic 
nature of the Argentine nation. Against these the hacendad 
could not stand. Yet he has been the symbol o:f Argentina 
~or so long that perhaps it is just that the truth of his 
:fall from power should be obscured by the existenc 
========*===,~== =====-~====~~~~~==~====~~ 
95 
military governments. 
The hacendado was catapulted to the height of his 
career in the years following the advent of refrigeration 11 
in 1877. By 1890 his tremendous wealth, derived from beef 
export and from land valorization, had made hin the uncon-
tested power in and symbol of the Argentine nation. Rut at 
this summit of his achievement the problems which were to 
cause his downfall vere inherent in the hace!ldado culture. 
/ The peon, living margin lly on the latifundio, began to 
look tovard the urhan life. The colono thought of ownershi 
rather than tenure of land. Industrialization received an 
impetus from the war shortage of consumer manufacture in 
Argentina . 
In the year 1943 the government of the h~cenclado no 
longer represented the true economic structure of Argentine 
life. The hacenda.§E. had learned no real lesson from the 11 
liberals either during their period of power or during the 
years that followed. The price a soci~l organism must pay 
for not adapting to the c P~nging scene is analogous to that 
paid by physical organisms that refuse to evolve to meet 
successfully new condi tio11s. control of 
Argentina as awarded to the economy of the industrialists 
by default . ·I 
The role of the hacendado in Argentine life is an I 
important, i~teresting, and colorful one• In its vigorous 
years the landed class contributed men of great stature to 
96 
the nation's development . This group, above all others 
in the nation, patterned the national growth and lere 
responsible ~or its internal economy and international 
position . They contributed their f'ull measure , v.nd then 
resigned, involuntarily, the responsibility of' leadership. 
Their contribution will have a long lasting e~~ect upon th 
nation they symbolized ~or so many years. 
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Abstract 
Argentinr , settled as c New World vice- roya lty of' the 
Spanish crown, was composed in its colonial period of' 
three classes: the Spanish overlord who governed but ~as 
not a permanent resident and in no sense an Argentine, the 
criollos who were Spaniards who came to make their f'ortune 
and stayed as a native population, and the gaucho, a 
peasant-horseman who attached himself' in f'eudal f'ashion to 
the land owning criollos. With the national independence 
and the removal of' the Spanish overlord at the be~inning 
of' the 19th century, the dominant criollos took leadership 
of' Argentine af'f'airs, and became through their strong 
leadership caudillos. 
Through the period of' Rosas and the struggle r etween 
unitarian and f'ederal governmenta l interests, as the India 
f'rontier was conquered and the f'rontiersman became a 
rancher, the caudillo and gauch_o were tr .nsf'ormed by the 
/ 
civilizing process to hacendado and ReoE• 
The hacendado, theref'ore, scion of the f'eudal landlor , 
inherited in our modern age the pre-eminent social positio 
of' the landed aristocracy. Conditions in Argentina, 
however, were unlike those in the rest of' the world. In 
other nations commerce and industry weakened the f'eudal 
landlords so that the aristocracy was economically reduced 
and its social and political po•er were vestigial remnants. 
In Argentina the f'irst ef'f'ect of commercial develo ment was 
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the increasing or the market ror the beer the landovner 
raised on his broad lands. The first effect of industrial 
development with the advent of salting plants and 
refrigerator ships was to increase many times the beef 
market. Thus in Argentina initial commercial and 
developments strengthened, rather than weakened the 
of the old, landed families. 
Arter the opening of distant markets hy the applied 
use of refrigeration, beginning in 1877, the wealth of the 
hacendad2 increased fabulously. Where hides had previously 
been the chief product of the rangy cattle on his broad 
pampas, it was now beef. Breeding came to have importance, 
an agrarian society produced immense wealth, land values 
soared dizzily. The wealthy and ambitious bought freely 
of public lands. Tremendous estates of either of one piece 
or of scattered pieces of land were the property of single 
families· These families joined with the interests of 
British capital investment in the development of railways 
to transport their beef to Buenos Aires from which it was 
shipped to the continent. AS the livestock industry 
flourished, specialists were brought in to manage the 
latifundios and a managerial revolution took place. The 
hacendado became an absentee landlord living in Buenos Aire 
or abroad on the wealth he derived from his holdings. 
The hacendados or Duenos Aires province sought a syste 
or govrrnment in which imports, exports, navigatio~ 
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commercial law, money , and roreign relations would 
represent their interests . Colonization had never been the 
aim or the Spanish hierarchy, and by the time the Rosas 
tyranny which impeded immigration rell, the pattern of' 
landownership in Argentina was crystallized in the vast 
holdings of' the hacendado. 
These holdings were in the f'orm or geographical 
latif'undios and latif'undios sociales . The concept is 
centered upon the quantity or land controlled by one man, 
ramily, or corporation . The dangers to the individual peO'n 
are the same as those round in any large scale organization I 
The hacendado assured himself' low taxes and the ability to 
avoid inheritance taxes through his power and position. 
Some minimum regulations upon the powerrul industry of' 
cattle raising have been made, but little has been done to 
implement them . 
The ethnocentrism or the hacendado is shown by various 
evidences. Because of' the economic ties through beef' with 
the continen~-particularly Britain, the hacendado does not 
have the same national interests as the rest or the popu-
lation. The hacendado opposes colonization, ror the 
immigrant might build a competing industrial economy. 
Socially the bacendado is paternalistic to the pe rin , 
associates with the well- educated who may become his 
mayor-domos at home, spends much or his time in Buenos Aires 
or abroad, and is a traveler, a politician, a scholar, and 
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a dilettante. The t . pical genius or the hacendado is 
embodied through their organization, Sociedad Rural 
Argentina. 
Berore the rrigor{ricos longhorn scrub cattle were 
raised chierly ror their hides, since transporting beer 
ror distances either on the boor or otherwise was next to 
impossible. With the advent or the rerrigerator ships and 
growth or the railroads the value or the hides yielded to 
the value or the beer, thus new ractors or breeding, 
rodder, and even immigration or cheap lahor needed to be 
considered. 
/ The peon was utterly dependent u~on the h8cendado ror 
his livelihood since there was not even anyone else to buy 
the crops that he might r aise . l'he hacendado all too orte ' 
was the absentee landlord concerned only with more cattle 
and more money , but none or the attendant problems. 
Because or this there is little stable rarm colonization 
and much land erosian. In the golden era or the hacendado 
the export value or his beer increased astonishin ly; the 
nation as a whole became proud or its world superiority in 
livestock and the hacendado was hailed hero. The inrlation 
in the late 1880's widened the economic gap between the 
hacendado and the rest or the nation. 
Young liberal intellectuals were the ones to rirst 
challenge the authority and rights or the hacendado. 
Hip6lito Irigoyen, leader or the liberal challenge, main-
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credit reserves from beer exports so that light industry 
could be encouraged . Elections were honest between 1916 
and 1930, but because Irigoyen did not know how to delegate ! 
power , he was overthrown by the hacendados with the aid of 
the army . Irigoyen attempted social reforms but his 
caudillo temperament, nepotism, etc . brought the downfall 
or democracy in Argentina . 
After the hacendado regained his power, he took steps 
to discredit the liberals in the eyes or the nation; but he 
ignored the descamisados , his own uncomplaining peones, and 
the eventual tool or his political downfall . Many felt 
that the hacendado should be heavily taxed , but not until 
1940 did a land law favoring the development or small farms 
pass the national legislature. It fell into disfavor with 
everyone concerned . In years or growing social conscious-
ness it became increasingly difficult to pretend that the 
economy or the hacendado was optimum for the nation. The 
hacendado felt it needed to limit the influence or the new 
industrial interests newly expressing themselves as a 
result or the incorporation or t he latifundio through the 
votes or the peones . 
Rapid industrialization in late depression and early 
World War II years meant another political force in the 
nation. In fact, it was the industrial economy which took 
the reins or government from about 1943 on . It was achieve 
by uniting all political and military segments who did not 
approve of the continuation of ~cendad~ dominance . 
Though the ~cendad~ is now dethroned politically and 
no longer the largest factor in the Argentine economy, it 
will be manY years before the slowly evolving mythoS will 
be able to postulate firmlY another supreme social being 
in hiS place • A sizeable minority economic power rests 
still in hiS hands , and it will be manY years before much 
can be considered in the Argentine economy without plannin 
the place of beef and of the ~cendadOS • 
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